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Abstract 
The majority of us use personal assistant technology every day. From calendar 
alerts to fitness goal reminders, we have come to depend on this automation to provide us 
with information about our lives and help us to make “better” decisions. Research has 
been published on how to best represent recommender information to users, but not much 
has been done in the way of studying decision aids for low risk daily use. This research 
aims to explore how users of this technology trust computer-generated suggestions and 
how best to display those suggestions to optimize trust and favorable performance 
outcomes for continued use.  
  
  
iv 
Table of Contents 
 
 
List of Tables          v 
List of Figures          vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose, and Aim      1  
Chapter 2: Building Trust in Navigation Decision Aids    3 
Chapter 3: Important Related Works       36  
Chapter 4: Study 1         49  
Chapter 5: Study 2         68  
Chapter 6: Self Report Survey Results and Discussion    82 
Chapter 7: Combined Empirical Analysis      88  
Chapter 8: Summary and Recommendation for Future Work   95 
References          100 
   
  
v 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Fitts List         4 
Table 2. Levels of Automation       5 
Table 3. Human Computer Trust        7 
Table 4. Purpose, Process, Performance Model of Trust    9  
Table 5. Empirical Support for Designing Trustworthy Systems   20 
Table 6. Performance Summary Tables      60 
Table 7. Objective Trust Summary Tables      62 
Table 8. Subjective Trust Summary Table      63 
Table 9. Performance Summary Tables      75 
Table 10. Objective Trust Summary Tables      77 
Table 11. Subjective Trust Summary Table      77 
Table 12. Anthropomorphic Mental State Summary Tables    86 
Table 13. Performance Summary Tables      90 
Table 14. Objective Trust Summary Tables      91 
Table 15. Subjective Trust Summary Table      92 
 
  
  
vi 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Riley’s Model of Automation Use      10 
Figure 2. Cognition vs Affect Model for Trust     14 
Figure 3. Framework for ATC trust       14 
Figure 4: PSW Model; Designing for Appropriate Trust in Automation  16  
Figure 5. Dynamic Interaction for Trust in Automation    18 
Figure 6. Iter Avto         23 
Figure 7. Toyota Navicom        25 
Figure 8. Honda Electro Gyrocator       26 
 
Figure 9. ETAK         26 
 
Figure 10. Oldsmobile Guidestar       28 
 
Figure 11. Alpine         30 
 
Figure 12. Garmin StreetPilot        30  
 
Figure 13. Garmin          31 
 
Figure 14. Mio         31 
 
Figure 15. Navigon         31 
 
Figure 16. Magellan         31 
 
Figure 17. TomTom         31 
 
Figure 18. Google Maps        33 
 
Figure 19. Clippy         46 
 
Figure 20. Big Triangle        48 
 
Figure 21. Anthropomorphic Images (non, low, high)    52 
Figure 22. Process         56 
  
vii 
 
Figure 23. Stimuli in Order of Appearance      58 
Figure 24. Proportion Correct Data        60 
 
Figure 25. Objective Trust Data       62 
 
Figure 26. Subjective Trust Data       63 
 
Figure 27. Anthropomorphic Images (non, high, full)    69 
Figure 28. Proportion Correct Data        75 
 
Figure 29. Objective Trust Data       77 
 
Figure 30. Subjective Trust Data       78 
 
Figure 31. Navigation Product Experience       83 
 
Figure 32. Trust Survey Correlation       84 
Figure 33. Trust Survey and Subjective Trust Correlation    85  
 
Figure 34. Proportion Correct Data        90 
 
Figure 35. Objective Trust Data       91 
 
Figure 36. Subjective Trust Data       92 
 
  
1 
Introduction, Purpose, and Aim 
 
Problem Statement  
The importance of developing trustworthy and socially acceptable personal 
assistive aids for everyday use is a tech industry priority. Numerous companies spend 
billions of dollars on research and development for creating useful automation to offload 
the burdens of daily life. Such automation can be perceived as creepy and/or invasive. 
These feelings are frequently associated with too much or too little of the following: 
Anthropomorphism or how human-like the automation seems, and transparency or 
knowledge of how the automation works. There simply is a need for a better 
understanding of how automation generates suggestions and guidance on how to 
humanize computer-generated aid. More specifically, the following research questions 
need to be addressed:  
1. What are the past and present industry practices as well as research advancements 
in designing for appropriate use and trust of navigation decision aids? 
2. Can level of anthropomorphism affect trust for different aid information 
reliability? 
3. How do humans behaviorally respond to visually anthropomorphized aids in a 
navigational context? 
The aforementioned questions are tested using different levels of anthropomorphic 
imagery paired with automated advice to see how visual representation influences trust 
and performance across varied information reliability conditions.     
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Objective 
The objective of the current study is to expand upon the existing research on 
human trust in automated decision aids by evaluating the effects of mid-range 
anthropomorphism and information reliability on system trust and performance. Current 
research efforts in this space are in highly critical systems with high associated risk such 
as self-driving cars and unmanned aerial systems. It is equally important to explore 
systems used by millions of people to make seemingly non-trivial life decisions on a 
daily basis. Implications of this research are massive as machine learning and predictive 
technologies become more and more ubiquitous. Big tech companies strive to understand 
how users will understand, trust, act, and perform using technology where automation has 
increasingly more decision-making power.        
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Building Trust in Navigation Decision Aids 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a chronological account of both trust in 
human automation interaction literature and in-vehicle routing and navigation systems. 
The section begins with a robust history of trust in automation research and serves as the 
main review of relevant trust literature for the project. Then, a product-focused discussion 
of in-vehicle routing and navigation systems leads to the current navigation decision aid 
technology used in this project. Showing a progression of products from a technological 
standpoint is useful for creating a deeper understanding of how the products work and 
what exactly changed in terms of function and capabilities. Routing and navigation 
products are presented in parallel to the chronological trust research review to help 
realize connections between theoretical work and the relevant technological products at 
that time. A comparison of this nature between product evolution and theoretical 
frameworks has the potential to encourage similar efforts to help bridge the divide 
between product research and development (R&D) and human related theories of 
interaction within a specific domain.  
 
History of Trust in Human Automation Interaction  
Function allocation.  Affective constructs of human interaction with technology 
began with a theoretical assessment of function allocation by Jeremy Fitts (1951). 
Function allocation by definition is a design process that refers to the division of 
activities between humans and machines in a system. Fitts boldly proposed that man and 
machine are comparable. He created what is known today as “Fitts List,” a two-column 
list organized by properties, with one labeled “human” and the other labeled “machine.” 
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It compares the functions for which man is superior to machines to the functions for 
which machines are superior to man. For example, Fitts List tells us that men are flexible 
but not consistent; whereas machines are consistent but not flexible. The list allows 
designers to choose machines for functions for which they are best suited, and men for 
the functions for which they are best suited (Fitts, 1951).  
 
Humans appear to surpass present-day machines in respect to the following: 
1. Ability to detect a small amount of visual or acoustic energy 7. Ability to respond quickly to control signals and to apply 
great force smoothly and precisely 
2. Ability to perceive patterns of light or sound 8. Ability to perform repetitive, routine tasks 
3. Ability to improvise and use flexible procedures 9. Ability to stare information briefly and then to erase it 
completely 
4. Ability to store very large amounts of information for long 
periods and to recall relevant facts at the appropriate time 
10. Ability to reason deductively, including computational 
ability 
5. Ability to reason inductively 11. Ability to handle highly complex operations, i.e., to do 
many different things at once 
6. Ability to exercise judgment   
Table 1. Fitts List. Adapted from "Human engineering for an effective air-navigation and 
traffic-control system" by Fitts, P. M.  
 
About a decade later, a second argument was made stating that men and machines 
are complementary rather than comparable as proposed by Fitts in 1951 (Jordan, 1963). 
Jordan argued that little progress had been made in the area of allocating functions 
between human and machine because of this comparative way of thinking. He further 
criticized man-machine comparability by deconstructing Fitts List. Jordan pointed out the 
following: machines can be tools used to extend a human’s abilities, machines can also 
be used to extend production methods utilized to replace the human completely, 
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responsibility can only be assigned to humans, and man degrades gracefully while 
machine does not.  
Further analysis by Jordan (1963) revealed that both humans and machines have a 
physical environment, but humans also have a psychological environment that 
encourages motivation and other affective constructs such as trust. By designing systems 
where humans do less, challenge is eliminated, thus motivation is eliminated as well. 
Given that humans function best under an optimum level of difficulty, machines can and 
should be used as tools to bring the perceptual and motor requirements to optimum levels 
of human performance; hence the complementary relationship.  
Sheridan and Verplank (1978) set the stage for the next development with a 
model of supervisory control, in which a human operator controlled a physical process 
through an intermediary computer. The Sheridan-Verplank Scale of Human-Machine 
Task Allocation (SVL) was the first real taxonomy of automation levels aimed at further 
organizing function allocation into distribution of tasks for various automation types. 
 
Sheridan-Verplank 10 Levels of Human-Machine Function Allocation 
1. The Human does all the planning, scheduling, optimizing, etc. and turns task over to computer for merely deterministic 
execution. 
2. Computer provides options, but human chooses between them, plans the operations, and then turns task over to computer for 
execution. 
3. Computer helps to determine options, and suggests one for use, which the human may or may not accept before turning task over 
to computer for execution. 
4. Computer elects options and plans actions, which human may or may not approve, computer can reuse options suggested by 
human. 
5. Computer selects action and carries it out if human approves. 
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6. Computer selects options, plans and actions and displays them in time for the human to intervene, and then carries them out in 
default if there is no human input. 
7. Computer does entire task and informs human of what it has done. 
8. Computer does entire task and informs human only if requested. 
9. Computer does entire task and informs human if it believes the latter needs to know. 
10. Computer performs entire task autonomously, ignoring the human supervisor who must completely trust the computer in all 
aspects of the decision-making. 
Table 2. Levels of Automation. Adapted from Human and Computer Control of 
Undersea Teleoperators, by Sheridan, T. B., and Verplank, W., 1978.  
 
In the early 1980s, Bainbridge (1983) wrote a paper addressing the ironies of 
automation, specifically, the claim of how automation can expand rather than eliminate 
problems for the human operator. Bainbridge argued that humans still need to be 
designed into the system even if they do not carry out the functions directly. As more 
functions are able to be automated, operators are taking on more of a monitor role. 
Bainbridge warned against operator skill deterioration and dissatisfaction for workers due 
to the shift to majority deskilled tasks. Ironically, humans are bad at vigilance tasks such 
as monitoring systems. In order to prevent human skill deterioration and dissatisfaction, 
Bainbridge suggested designing systems in which the operator is provided assistance (i.e., 
alarms) to help recognize problems in the system. Additionally, adequate training should 
be provided, and real system usage (i.e., drills) should be practiced to help form and keep 
accurate mental models of the system. Lastly, Bainbridge referenced Jordan’s concept 
known as “graceful degradation” (Bainbridge, 1983). Graceful degradation refers to 
failing slowly, allowing the operator to notice the issue and address the problem (Jordan, 
  
7 
1963). Bainbridge believed that automation should fail gracefully just as a person 
completing a manual task may fail gracefully.  
Interpersonal trust adaptations.  Engineering psychology up until the late 
1980s had been mostly focused on work process automation and ergonomic design. In 
her early work, Muir (1989) identified a large gap in research around how humans 
affectively relate to automation. Muir proposed that trust in machines could be 
understood by adapting existing theories and models of interpersonal trust. Muir used two 
main perspectives of trust developed by Barber (1983) and Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna 
(1985) to create a framework for the human-automation relationship.  
 
Basis of expectation at different levels of expertise 
Dimension from Barber (1983)                        Dynamic Dimension from Rempel et al. (1985) 
Expectation Predictability (of acts) Dependability (of 
dispositions) 
Faith (in motives) 
Persistence 
  Natural physical 
  Natural biological 
  Moral social 
  
Events conform to natural laws 
Human life has survived 
Human and computers act 
“decently” 
  
Nature is lawful 
Human survival is lawful 
Human and computers are 
“good” and “decent” by 
nature 
  
Natural laws are constant 
Human life will survive 
Human and computers will 
continue to be “good” and 
“decent” in the future 
Technical competence j’s behavior is predictable j has a dependable nature j will continue to be 
dependable in the future 
Fiduciary responsibility j’s behavior is consistently 
responsible 
j has a responsible nature j will continue to be 
responsible in the future 
 
Table 3. Human Computer Trust. Adapted from Operators' trust in and use of automatic 
controllers in a supervisory process control task, by Muir, B. M., 1989. 
 
 
With “j” signifying computer actions, expectations for this model are loosely defined as 
follows: persistence refers to the frequency of natural and moral social orders. Technical 
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competence can be thought of as the ability of the other agent to demonstrate expertise 
and perform accordingly. Fiduciary responsibility is the expectation that the other agent 
will have some moral obligation to prioritize the other agent’s interest before their own. 
Muir’s main argument is that trust changes as a result of continued interactions 
between a human operator and the automated system. Trust in an automated system starts 
out as a function of the system’s predictability and consistency. After moderate use, trust 
shifts to reflect the operator’s attribution of the system’s dependability. Over time, the 
operator is able to gather behavioral evidence of system performance which again alters 
trust as the operator can infer a broader set of attributions about the nature and motives of 
the automation. Eventually, the operator trust becomes an ability to project and predict 
their own use and belief in the system’s future actions. This is what Muir refers to as faith 
in the automation.  
Around the same time, Lee and Moray (1992) identified similar factors of trust 
claiming that performance, process, and purpose formed a foundation of human trust in a 
system. Performance includes the past and present operation of the machine including its 
reliability and predictability. Performance, more specifically, is the ability of the 
automation to achieve the human operator’s goals through expertise and execution. This 
concept is highlighted by Sheridan (1992) who defined robustness as a foundation for 
trust in human-automation relationships. The operator will tend towards trusting 
automation that reliably achieves the set goals.  
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Table 4. Purpose, Process, Performance model of trust 
 Barber (1983) Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) Zuboff (1988) 
Purpose  Fiduciary responsibility Faith  Leap of faith 
Process  Dependability  Understanding 
Performance Technical competent 
performance 
Predictability  Trial and error experience 
Foundation  Persistence of natural laws   
 
Table 4. Purpose, Process, Performance model of trust. Adapted from Trust in 
automation: Integrating empirical evidence on factors that influence trust, by Hoff, K. A, 
and Bashir, M., 2015. 
 
 
Trust in automation models.  Muir (1994) took the above adaptations of 
interpersonal trust perspectives and developed the first theoretical qualitative model for 
trust in automation. The model helped to further define the relationship between humans 
and machines while focusing on how operators can calibrate their trust in an automated 
system. Muir and Moray (1996) set out to empirically test if these interpersonal trust 
adaptations could extend to an applied automation setting. Through simulation, 
participants in the experiments were asked to optimize milk production by varying the 
balance between manual and automatic control. Most operators in the first study 
preferred manual control almost exclusively which created a ceiling effect and made the 
relationship between trust and automation use particularly hard to understand. The second 
experiment was arranged in a way to reduce manual control bias found in Study 1 and 
showed a strong positive relationship between operator trust and use of automatic mode. 
These results supported the first dimension of the model of trust in automation where 
competency and responsibility expectations of the system are the main source of trust 
variance for the operator. There is additional empirical evidence that supports the 
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model’s second dimension. Results alluded to a shift among predictability, dependability, 
and faith over time which also impacted trust among participants. The data showed that 
faith may be a better predictor of automation usage early on rather than after continued 
use which was originally postulated separately by both Muir (1994) and Moray (Lee and 
Moray, 1992). Overall, findings from these experiments revealed that the same factors 
influence the development of trust for both interpersonal and automation relationships, 
but maybe not in the same order.  
Riley (1994) created model of automation reliance that shows a different set of 
influencing factors derived from human psychology literature. Figure 1 shows a 
collection of factors of which theoretical relationships between them are displayed via 
dashed line.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Riley’s model of automation use. Adapted from A theory of operator reliance 
on automation, by Riley, V., 1994. 
 
 
Riley (1994) also chose to empirically investigate the validity of the relationships 
in his proposed model of automation use. Each lab-based experiment included a 
computer task where participants had to decide whether or not to rely on the automation 
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to perform a task. Aspects of workload, task uncertainty, and automation reliability were 
measured using a computer game task while risk-taking was assessed through a gambling 
task and series of questionnaires. Results indicated that automation reliability, task 
uncertainty, and risk do influence an operator’s decision to use automation. Another 
outcome was empirical reasoning to separate trust in automation from uncertainty of 
automation states in order to better understand the dynamic nature of how humans use an 
automation. However, results were unable to show a relationship between workload and 
automation use. Interestingly, Riley found that people are fairly bad at assessing their 
own expertise which is thought to impact automation use.  
Expertise and self-confidence were further evaluated by Kantowitz, Hanowski, 
and Kantowitz (1997) who measured the relationship of trust and self-confidence to 
driver acceptance of ATIS. This study was designed to provide data that would aid the 
ATIS designers in selecting an appropriate level of system accuracy (reliability). Two 
traffic routes were given to participants: one was a “familiar network” and the other was 
a “new city.” Information accuracy was set at 100%, 71%, or 43%, and the authors found 
that drivers with low self-confidence in unfamiliar settings would accept and trust less 
accurate information. Kantowitz et al. (1997) defined confidence as how sure a person 
was in decision-considering factors such as expertise. Other important trust-related 
findings from this study include: (a) trust in the system is higher when information is 
accurate, (b) trust could be recovered if accurate information is presented on subsequent 
links, and (c) inaccurate information decreases trust more in familiar settings. Essentially, 
when self-confidence is greater than trust, manual control is preferred (Kantowitz et al., 
1997).  
  
12 
Other social constructs traditionally studied within social psychology literature, 
such as personality and emotion, began to drift into the human-computer interaction 
(HCI) realm. Research by Reeves and Nass (1996) illustrated that humans respond 
socially to technology, and that reactions to computers and reactions to human 
collaborators can be similar. For example, social psychologists predict that people with 
similar personality characteristics will be attracted to each other; this is known as the 
similarity attraction hypothesis coined by Nass and Lee in 2001. User acceptance of 
software is also predicted by this finding. Users tend to accept software more readily 
when it displays personality characteristics that are similar to their own. Beyond 
personality, the concept of affective computing suggests that human-computer interaction 
may significantly improve when computers can sense and respond to the user’s emotional 
states (Picard & Picard, 1997).  
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) further addressed theoretical, empirical, and 
analytical studies pertaining to human use, misuse, disuse, and abuse of automation 
technology. Understanding the factors associated with each of these aspects of human use 
of automation can lead to improved system design, effective training methods, and 
judicious policies and procedures involving automation use. Together, Parasuraman and 
Riley created a simple four-part classification system human-automation interaction: Use, 
Misuse, Disuse, and Abuse.  
Automation Use refers to the voluntary activation or disengagement of 
automation by human operators. Trust, mental workload, and risk can influence 
automation use, but interactions between factors and large individual differences make 
prediction of automation use difficult (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
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Automation Misuse refers to overreliance on automation that can result in failures 
of monitoring or decision biases. Factors affecting the monitoring of automation include 
workload, automation reliability and consistency, and the saliency of automation state 
indicators. Some design solutions include emergent displays, system feedback, and 
adaptive automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
Automation Disuse is the neglect or underutilization of automation and is 
commonly caused by alarms that activate falsely. This often occurs because the base rate 
of the condition to be detected is not considered in setting the trade-off between false 
alarms and omissions. According to sensitivity theory, omission is the failure to respond 
which is otherwise known as a miss. (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
Automation Abuse deals with the automation of functions by designers and 
implementation by managers without regard for consequences for human performance. It 
tends to define the operators’ roles as by-products of the automation. Automation Abuse 
can also promote misuse and disuse of automation by human operators (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997). 
Madsen and Gregor (2000) separated cognition from affect in a model of human 
computer trust (HCT). The emotionally driven, affect-based component plays a greater 
role in situations where the operator’s perceived knowledge in the system and expertise is 
too low to make a cognitive decision. The operator’s perceived knowledge in the system 
is defined as the cognition-based component of human-computer trust. While the model 
is void of procedural development and dynamic changes in trust, it incorporates well-
studied and familiar factors such as competence, system reliability, and faith.  
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Figure 2. Cognition vs Affect Model for Trust. Adapted from Measuring human-computer 
trust, by Madsen, M., and Gregor, S., 2000. 
 
Kelly et al. (2001) developed a subjective measure of trust and an accompanying 
model of trust in automation that aimed to provide a framework for automation design. It 
is important to note that the model was developed specific to the air traffic control 
domain. The model shows relationships among the comprehensive list of factors. 
According to Kelly et al., the operator’s ability to understand the system, the competence 
of the system itself, and the operator’s perceived self-confidence are the three main 
contributing factors to the overall level of trust in an automated system. 
 
Figure 3. Framework for ATC trust. Adapted from Principles and Guidelines for the 
Development of Trust in Future ATM Systems: A Literature Review, by Kelly et al., 2001 
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Kelly et al. are some of the first to directly integrate skills and training into a 
model of trust in automation. However, the relationship to self-confidence is a bit 
assumptive in that it implies an exclusive impact through the operator’s self image when 
it will likely also directly affect the operator’s direct interactions with automation. 
Another uniqueness of this model lies in the distinctions made between automation 
performance and the operator’s understanding of how the automation works. By viewing 
trust in this way, Kelly et al. imply that operator trust in automation is relative. In other 
words, performance may not matter as much in terms of system trust if an automated 
system is not designed in a way that can be easily understood by operators. 
 
Applied trust models for designing automation.  Perhaps the most widely 
applicable model comes from designing automation with the knowledge of appropriate 
function allocation that can help to mitigate many of the failures listed above. Refer back 
to the levels and types of automation proposed by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 
(2000); a continuation of their work comes in the form of an iterative model that steps 
designers through a decision process (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: PSW model; designing for appropriate trust in automation. Adapted from A 
model for types and levels of human interaction with automation, by Parasuraman, R., 
Sheridan, T. B., and Wickens, C. D., 2000.  
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After identifying the type and level of automation for the given task, the next step 
is to consider the human performance consequences. Within the model, performance 
consequences are prioritized and split into two waves to encourage iterative process. The 
first wave is termed Primary Evaluative Criteria and includes factors such as workload, 
complacency, and situation awareness. Secondary Evaluative Criteria are to be 
considered after the Primary Evaluative Criteria. Reliability and Cost of Decision (i.e., 
action consequences and risk propensity) are the main factors in the second wave. These 
criteria will be discussed later on as manipulations in research evaluating trust in 
automation. Automation design is not an exact science and therefore Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens suggest the use of bounds in their framework that provide a 
systematic approach to iterative design. 
Lee and See (2004) wrote the first notable review of trust in automation and 
created a conceptual model of the dynamic process which governs trust and reliance. 
According to Lee and See (2004), “three critical elements of this framework include: the 
closed-loop dynamics of trust and reliance, the importance of the context on trust and on 
mediating the effect of trust on reliance, and the role of information display on 
developing appropriate trust.” Figure 5 expands on concepts exhibited in the following 
frameworks: Bisantz and Seong (2001) and Riley (1994) whose frameworks showed a 
dynamic interaction between the operator, context, and automation interface. Dzindolet, 
Pierce, Beck, and Dawe (2002) focused on the role of cognitive, social, and motivational 
processes that combine to influence reliance. Dzindolet et al. (2002) targeted changes in 
motivational processes along with cognitive processes to help explain reliance on 
automation. The general idea is that factors such as subjective workload, self-confidence, 
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effort to engage, and perceived risk are most pertinent to intent formation. When the 
operator has formed a solid use intent, other factors relating to time and configuration 
constraints may affect the initial reliance on automation. Ultimately, the decision to rely 
on automation is context dependent. Even so, factors affecting performance such as 
maintenance and weather, can cause inappropriate reliance.  
 
 
Figure 5. Dynamic interaction for trust in automation. Adapted from The role of trust in 
automation reliance, by Dzindolet, M. T. et al., 2003. 
 
Design features affecting trust.  Parasuraman and Miller (2004) studied the 
effects of automated information delivery in terms of etiquette, or machine politeness. 
They discovered that non-personified machine etiquette strongly affected human trust, 
usage decisions, and human-automation system performance. Parasuraman & Miller 
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(2004) hypothesized that good etiquette could compensate for poor reliability and result 
in increased usage decisions. They tested this in a 2x2 flight simulator study using low 
(45%) and high levels (70%) of reliability and low and high etiquette, and found that 
machine etiquette could strongly affect human trust, usage decisions, and human-
automation system performance. Good automation etiquette enhanced diagnostic 
performance, regardless of automation reliability. The effects of etiquette overcame low 
reliability, and performance of good etiquette/low reliability was almost as good as high 
reliability/low etiquette (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). 
Good automation etiquette enhanced diagnostic performance, regardless of 
automation reliability; its effects overcame low reliability. This builds on etiquette-
affected trust in automation work from Nass and Lee (2001). Nass and Lee found that in 
order to maximize liking and trust, designers should set parameters that create a 
personality that is consistent with the user and the content being presented. These 
parameters may include qualities such as words per minute and frequency range. 
Other research in the early 2000s on computer etiquette suggested that 
recognizing and understanding the interactions of social and work context with the roles 
of the computer and human to specify acceptable behavior, can enhance human-computer 
interactions (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). In highly critical domains, etiquette exhibited 
by non-personified machines and computer-based automation (such as facial expressions, 
speech, voice tones, and gestures) can overwhelmingly affect users’ perceptions and the 
optimal usage of them (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004).  
Machine etiquette can influence trust, which impacts use of automation that is 
correctly calibrated. While some critics may view etiquette as superfluous or negatable, 
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consider the following example of failure related to etiquette (miscalibration): The ship, 
Royal Majesty, ran aground because the GPS failed and did not alert the crew that it had 
failed. A human using a GPS would have alerted the crew if it had failed, so the crew 
assumed that the automation would do the same (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). This is a 
great example of misuse in the form of automation complacency, inappropriate trust and 
overreliance on automation. 
Below is a summary of applied trust in automation between the years of 2002 and 
2012 taken from a systematic empirical review by Hoff and Bashir (2015).  
Design Feature Design Recommendation Source of Empirical Support 
Appearance/ 
Anthropomorphism 
Increase the anthropomorphism of 
automation in order to promote greater 
trust 
de Visser et al. (2012); Pak et al. 
(2012) 
Consider the expected age, gender, culture, 
and personality of potential users because 
anthropomorphic design features may 
impact trust differently for diverse 
individuals 
E.J. Lee (2008); Pak et al. (2012) 
Ease-of-Use Simplify interfaces and make automation 
easy to use to promote greater trust 
Atoyan et al. (2006); Gefen et al. 
(2003); Li & Yeh (2010); Ou & Sia 
(2010); Zhou (2011) 
Consider increasing the saliency of 
automation feedback to promote greater 
trust 
Wang et al. (2011) 
Communication Style Consider the gender, eye movements, 
normality of form, and chin shape of 
embodied computer agents to ensure an 
appearance of trustworthiness 
Gong (2008); Green (2010); E.J. Lee 
(2008) 
Increase the politeness of an automated 
system’s communication style to promote 
greater trust 
Parasuraman & Miller (2004); Spain 
& Madhavan (2009) 
Transparency/ Feedback Provide users with accurate, ongoing 
feedback concerning the reliability of 
automation and the situational factors that 
can affect its reliability in order to promote 
appropriate trust and improve task 
performance 
Bagheri & Jamieson (2004); Bass et 
al. (2013); Bean et al. (2011); Beck et 
al. (2007); Dadashi et al. (2012); 
Dzindolet et al. (2002); Dzindolet et 
al. (2003); Gao & Lee (2006); 
Jamieson et al. (2008); Oduor & 
Wiebe (2008); Seong & Bisantz 
(2008); Seppelt & Lee (2007); Wang 
et al. (2009) 
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Evaluate tendencies in how users interpret 
system reliability information displayed in 
different formats 
Lacson et al. (2005); Neyedli et al. 
(2011) 
Consider providing operators with 
additional explanations for automation 
errors that occur early in the course of an 
interaction or on tasks likely to be 
perceived as “easy” in order to discourage 
automation disuse 
Madhavan et al., 2006; Manzey et al., 
2012; Sanchez, 2006 
Level of Control Consider increasing the transparency of 
high-level automation to promote greater 
trust 
Veberne et al. (2012) 
Evaluate user preferences for levels of 
control based on psychological 
characteristics 
Thropp (2006) 
 
Table 5. Empirical Support for designing trustworthy systems. Adapted from Trust in 
automation: Integrating empirical evidence on factors that influence trust, by Hoff, K. A, 
and Bashir, M., 2015. 
 
Not listed in the table above is a study by Merritt, Heimbaugh, LaChapell, and 
Lee (2012) assessing the implicit attitudes of users toward automation, and how this helps 
predict explicit trust in a specific automated system. Implicit attitudes are unconscious 
processes that affect behavior automatically and predominantly, whereas explicit 
processes, including explicit trust, are cognitively effortful and conscious. Prior to this, 
there were no empirical studies examining how implicit attitudes toward automation 
might affect user’s explicit trust in the system. Participants self-reported a measure of 
their tendency to trust in machines, and completed an Implicit Association Test to 
measure their attitude toward automation (Merritt et al., 2012). Participants then 
completed a within-subjects 30-trial X-ray screening task. X-ray images were provided of 
luggage and participants were asked to determine whether each image contained a gun or 
knife. While completing the task, they were placed under cognitive load to more 
accurately simulate real-world working conditions. The user’s explicit propensity to trust 
and implicit attitude toward automation did not correlate significantly. The researchers 
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suggest that implicit attitudes can be used to calibrate trust, and further believe that this 
can be useful for establishing trust in new systems, like GPS technology, that previously 
may have had low levels of accuracy (Merritt et al., 2012). 
 
Applied Discussion   
Sheridan and Verplank’s ten levels of automation (1978) can vary across 
automation types which can be clustered by a four-piece model similar to human 
information processing. The four types taken from Parasuraman et al. (2000) include 
acquisition, analysis, decision, and action which map to the following stages of human 
information processing, respectively: information processing, information analysis, 
decision selection, action implementation. Advanced traveler information systems (ATIS) 
at their core are a decision aiding technology. Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) 
encompass a wide range of technologies, one of which is ATIS. It provides real time, in-
vehicle information to drivers regarding navigation and route guidance, motorist services, 
roadway signing, and hazard warnings. Other ITS technologies include Advanced 
Vehicle Control Systems (AVCS) which take over some or all of the driving tasks 
particularly in emergency situations, Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVOs) which 
include things like vehicle identification, location, etc., and Advanced Traffic 
Management Systems (ATMS) which reduce congestion using vehicle route diversion, 
automated signal timing, changeable message signs, and priority control systems. For the 
purpose of this discussion only certain aspects of ATIS relating to in-vehicle information 
will be used. While the main focus is on In-Vehicle Routing and Navigation Systems 
(IRANS), other related technologies should be mentioned. They are: In-Vehicle Motorist 
Services Information Systems (IMSIS), In-Vehicle Signing Information Systems (ISIS), 
  
23 
and In-Vehicle Safety Advisory Warning Systems (IVSAWS). Together, these 
technologies provide drivers with an on-road experience that promotes safety and 
efficiency (Barfield and Dingus, 1998). 
As time and technology progress, level of automation within decision aid 
technologies, like in-vehicle routing and navigation systems, vary. In this section, a 
chronological exposure to routing and navigation product releases is discussed in relation 
to the trust literature. Features of each navigation product are analyzed in terms of factors 
affecting trust in the system as reported by researchers in the field.  
Predating most research in the human automation interaction realm, the 1932 Iter 
Avto was not quite a decision technology; it was more of a low-level analysis technology. 
Based on the speed of the car, the system automatically progressed a paper scrolling map 
display in the direction the vehicle was moving. This system was the first of its kind and 
built to help alleviate mental workload by eliminating the need to pull the car over to 
examine a folding paper map while on the road. With a crude manual display, error 
recovery was cumbersome at best.  
 
Figure 6. Iter Avto. Reprinted from Before There was GPS: Personal Navigation in the 1920s 
and 1930s, by Dempsey, K., 2013, Retrieved from https://www.gislounge.com/gps-navigation-
1920s-1930s/  
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General Motors created DAIR in the late 1960s as the next step for in-vehicle 
navigation (Preston, 2013). Among other features including emergency communication, 
DAIR had the first active communicative display using a network of lights and buzzers to 
inform the driver which direction to turn. The catch was that drivers needed to have 
destination-specific cards to insert into the dashboard so that signals buried in the road 
could be matched and the system could therefore direct them accordingly. While 
confined to a test area near Detroit, DAIR took the guesswork out of navigating with 
turn-by-turn instructions effectively eliminating the need for drivers to read and encode 
street names (Preston, 2013). Helping drivers to make simple navigation decisions like 
when and where to turn, DAIR was a great example of decision automation. A fair 
amount of human inputs were still needed for the system to work and despite the 
directive lights and buzzers, the human had to ultimately carry out the decision to turn. 
The most interesting tie to research in the 1960s was with Jordan’s warning of human 
motivation loss. With this type of system, what motivates the human to understand routes 
and be familiar with street names when the machine is capable of doing that process? 
This small peek at turn-by-turn navigation, albeit never launched, provided great insight 
into human response to automated turn by turn navigation and issues that may arise.  
In the early 1970s, Japanese researchers developed CACS a system that achieved 
dynamic route guidance using inputs from other ITS technology such as ATMS (Fujii, 
1989). Some consider this the first attempt at an integrated intelligent routing and 
transportation system; using car volume and traffic information to route vehicles 
appropriately. As early as 1981, Japanese automakers began integrating this concept 
directly into vehicles. All with slightly different executions, Nissan, Toyota, and Honda 
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all attempted electronic in-vehicle displays for in-progress routing (Regan, Lee, & 
Young, 2008). The general point of the display was to communicate location information 
to the driver in a simple, digestible way. The most abstract display was Nissan’s Drive 
Guide system which showed the driver distance left in bar graph form. This system 
arguably increased cognitive load by forcing the driver to transform what was seen from 
the bar graph to the actual route and physical surroundings. Navicom was capable of 
generating a line between two points and graphically displaying progress on the line 
abstraction of the route which did not adequately take route shape into account 
(Newcomb, 2013). With the Navicom display, the line was at least representative of a 
road which could allow the driver to establish a quicker connection between the display 
and the real world. Probably the best example of a display was Honda’s release of the 
Electro Gyrocator in 1981 (Newcomb, 2013). The Electro Gyrocator had the first 
electronic in-vehicle map display. The display showed drivers where they were on a 
scaled map and which direction they were heading. A few years later, Etak, a U.S. 
aftermarket system, also offered a robust electronic map display. Maps were stored on 
cassette tapes and a car icon was placed on the map showing approximate location. In the 
late 1980s similar beacon-based systems were being tested in London and Berlin (Regan 
et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 7. Toyota Navicom. Reprinted from Hand-Cranked Maps to the Cloud: Charting 
the History of In-Car Navigation, by Newcomb, D., 2010. Retrieved from 
https://www.wired.com/2013/04/history-in-car-navigation/ 
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Figure 8. Honda Electro Gyrocator. Reprinted from Hand-Cranked Maps to the Cloud: 
Charting the History of In-Car Navigation, by Newcomb, D., 2010. Retrieved from 
https://www.wired.com/2013/04/history-in-car-navigation/ 
 
 
Figure 9. ETAK. Reprinted from Hand-Cranked Maps to the Cloud: Charting the History 
of In-Car Navigation, by Newcomb, D., 2010. Retrieved from 
https://www.wired.com/2013/04/history-in-car-navigation/ 
 
Physically placing one’s location on an electronic map and displaying progression 
through an accurately represented space offered a new way for drivers to conceptualize 
navigation while driving. Thanks to augmented dead reckoning, these products could 
reliably recreate roadway systems within the vehicle causing an attentional split between 
the real world and its electronic adaptation. Related research during this time came from 
Bainbridge (1983) in his ironies of automation paper, warning of skill degradation for 
humans. This concept introduced the idea that humans can become too dependent on 
automation and addressed some of the associated dangers.  
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The aforementioned in-vehicle navigation products of the 1980s all required 
human inputs. Input methods included keyboards, knobs, or a single button depending on 
the product. With the exception of Etak, all inputs were operational while driving. Inputs 
were still necessary but even then posed an interesting driver distraction issue which 
influenced the direction of driving related research at the turn of the century.  
Not long after the debut of electronic in-vehicle navigation systems came the idea 
that humans may interact with machines similarly to how they interact with other people 
(Muir, 1989; Lee & Moray, 1992). Using interpersonal trust research as a foundation for 
a human-automation interaction model, Muir (1994) and Riley (1994) proposed a group 
of factors contributing to the dynamic relationship of trust between humans and 
automation. The idea being that factors such as responsibility, competence, and 
predictability which contribute to how humans trust other humans could be adapted to fit 
how humans relate to technology. 
Muir (1994) focused more on system predictability and consistency as an 
extension of Barber’s (1983) dimensions of technical competence, while Riley (1994) 
showed how humans could become reliant on automation by organizing associated 
factors such as trust and perceived risk. Lee and Moray (1992) reflected on the 
importance of system reliability via performance and system purpose. They argued that 
system performance was key for establishing trust in an automated system, and that the 
initial few interactions greatly contributed to the human’s overall perception of its 
reliability.  
At the same time as this first real theoretical connection between trust and system 
reliability, the global positioning service (GPS) began being integrated into in-vehicle 
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navigation systems as early as 1990, while the first GPS-based system in the U.S. was 
Oldsmobile’s Guidestar in 1995 on a less accurate government scrambled GPS signal 
(Dunbar, 2015; Mateja, 1995). The accuracy afforded by GPS technology increased the 
reliability of location services thus affecting navigation system performance. Up until the 
mid 1990s, factors affecting in-vehicle routing and navigation systems capabilities were 
the biggest hindrance to the trusting relationship between humans and automation. 
 
Figure 10. Oldsmobile Guidestar. Reprinted from Automotive navigation systems, by 
Arlt, G., 2016. Retrieved from https://www.historicvehicle.org/automotive-navigation-
systems/  
 
Realizing the natural inclination for humans to treat technology like other 
humans, the progression of in-vehicle systems in the 1990s included the addition of GPS 
and more robust interaction models; some including voice interaction. In 1992, Toyota 
debuted a voice-assisted system in their Celsior model. The inclusion of voice interaction 
as a modality for vehicle navigation was important for two main reasons: first, it made 
the interaction more similar to that of another human, and second, it helped drivers to 
keep eyes on the road.  
Related research in the mid 1990s came from empirical validation and slight 
modification of the early proposed trust in automation models, Muir and Moray (1996). 
Contrary to previous thought, findings indicated that faith over system performance was a 
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better predictor of early automation use. The concept of “faith” is unique in that it is 
traditionally an affect-rooted term which authors redefined to fit the scope of automation. 
Faith, or when operator trust becomes an ability to project and predict their own use and 
belief in the system’s future actions, is difficult to measure and better explained by 
combinations of other variables such as risk-taking, perceived expertise, and self-
confidence (Riley, 1994; Kantowitz et al. 1997).  
At some point in the mid 1990s with a rise in personal computers, the internet, 
and technology for the middle class (like GPS), the benefits and accessibility of using 
automation were realized more widely. In 1996, internet maps and routing directions 
made an aggressive move into homes and therefore into vehicles via personalized paper 
maps and routing directions. Drivers would enter start and end destinations and websites 
like MapQuest would generate a map and list of turn-by-turn instructions for them to 
print. What seems like a step back in terms of level of automation, was actually a huge 
step forward into free and accessible ITS for the masses. In the late 1990s most in-vehicle 
routing and navigation systems products were only afforded by the elite. 
The shift from cassette to CD-ROM marked a turning point for both in-vehicle 
and aftermarket systems. In 1997, Alpine introduced one of the first navigation systems 
that used GPS and stored maps and the operating system on CDs (Newcomb, 2013). 
Instead of several cassettes for each city, consumers only had to purchase a disc for a 
multistate region of the U.S. The early Alpine models used a control that was larger than 
most modern mobile phones to input characters for a destination address. The first 
portable GPS systems, including Garmin StreetPilot, debuted in 1998 (Newcomb, 2013).  
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Figures 11 & 12. Alpine, Garmin StreetPilot. Reprinted from Automotive navigation 
systems, by Arlt, G., 2016. Retrieved from https://www.historicvehicle.org/automotive-
navigation-systems/  
 
The emergence of hard-drive navigation systems meant there was no longer a 
need for multiple discs; the maps were already built in. In 2003, Toyota introduced the 
first hard disk drive-based system (Newcomb, 2013). Those systems were more 
convenient and loaded maps and destinations faster, but they were difficult to update, 
which impacted their reliability for lack of system relevancy.  
By the mid 2000s, Garmin, Mio, Navigon, Magellan, TomTom, and others 
flooded the market with stand-alone GPS devices (Newcomb, 2013). These devices used 
available operating systems like Embedded Linux or Windows Embedded CE. Some of 
the higher-end models offered real-time traffic, map upgrades, terrain mapping, and high-
resolution screens. Typical consumers bought one device and just used it with multiple 
vehicles for many years. The most important changes in newly-released models related 
mostly to map data and the point of interest (POI) database which most consumers were 
willing to forgo. 
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Figures 13, 14 & 15. Garmin, Mio, Navigon. Reprinted from Automotive navigation 
systems, by Arlt, G., 2016. Retrieved from http://www.gpsinformation.org/i3/i3.html  
 
 
Figures 16 & 17. Magellan and TomTom. Adapted from Automotive navigation systems, 
by Arlt, G., 2016. Retrieved from https://www.historicvehicle.org/automotive-navigation-
systems/  
 
Research-wise, the concern of automation adoption due to poor system 
performance and reliability (disuse) quickly turned to a concern of human judgement in 
using the technology in spite of its failures. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) created a four-
part classification of automation use that lists overreliance on technology (misuse) as a 
major detriment to both performance and ultimately trust over time. Instead of working to 
understand how to establish and maintain the highest level of trust in a system, 
researchers moved to look at how to achieve appropriate reliance and trust in an 
automated system. 
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The switch from theoretical connections with interpersonal psychology to applied 
design of automation occurred in the mid 2000s. As in-vehicle routing and navigation 
systems technology became more reliable and products flooded the market, the focus fell 
to interface and information display. It was realized that the way in which drivers 
physically interact with the system may affect psychological judgments of the system. 
From physical inputs to visual and auditory perception of information, research surfaced 
on how to design in-vehicle routing and navigation systems for appropriate trust.  
Navigation systems at the time (and still today) used three primary guidance 
display screens to communicate navigation information to drivers (a) maps, (b) direction 
lists, and (b) turn-by-turn guidance which notifies the driver before a turn. “Maps can be 
effectively used to plan a route since they provide a pictorial representation of an area or 
region, while ordered lists of directions can limit information processing and lead to fast 
and accurate navigation performance.” Portable aftermarket systems at this time included 
Garmin, Magellan, and TomTom, most of which boasted color displays, split screen 
views for map and turn-by-turn directions, voice commands, and dedicated hard controls 
for system inputs and repeated functions (Llaneras and Singer, 2003).  
Beyond basic usable, functional system design, research in the coming years 
aimed to find the extent to which increasingly human-like automation influenced trust in 
the system and optimal performance/continued use over time. Anthropomorphism and 
etiquette made another strong research surge during this time, claiming that age, gender, 
culture, personality and politeness may impact trust differently for diverse individuals 
(Gong, 2008; Lee, 2008). Alternatively, on the system level, providing continuous and 
accurate feedback promotes trust and improves performance (Dzindolet et al., 2002; 
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Wang, Jamieson, & Hollands, 2009). Results from this era of research yielded in-vehicle 
routing and navigation systems features such as personalizable voice output, more natural 
language searches by grouping (i.e., restaurants, pharmacy), and even confidence 
intervals for estimated time of arrival (ETA).  
2007 began the smartphone’s rise in popularity as GPS was readily integrated and 
applications such as Google Maps gained traction. Google Maps was free for iPhone 
users at the start and remains free today on a wider variety of platforms (Gruber, 2006). 
Most of the changes through the turn of the decade centered around social inclusion. 
Technology at this time shifted from mostly functional to highly social. Companies like 
Waze developed systems leveraging social altruism and aspects of play to create a 
trusting community of users (Empson, 2013). Following the social trend, people no 
longer only wanted to navigate to a destination, they wanted to navigate to a person (who 
may not always be stationary). Location sharing features from personal smartphone 
devices began appearing and continue to be used for routing and navigation among other 
things. 
 
Figure 18. Google Maps. Adapted from Automotive navigation systems, by Arlt, G., 
2016. Retrieved from https://www.historicvehicle.org/automotive-navigation-systems/  
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Computing restrictions in the early years of navigation products did not allow for 
robust psychologically based interaction research. The refinement of electronic displays 
in the 1990s seemed to jumpstart the research on trust in technology. Information 
reliability and predictability was important, but how information was displayed to the 
human had the most impact on affective judgments such as trust. The emerging pattern, at 
least for this domain, is that the development of new technology raises societal questions 
further propagated by previously existing theoretical models. As more is understood 
about the applications of the new technologies, theoretical models are adapted to fit the 
more specific use cases and then empirically supported becoming applied models. Based 
on results from empirical studies, changes are made for new products using similar 
technologies in order to improve the experience or performance. With the increasing 
reliability and adoption of technology, finer details within design and technology 
implementation were able to be researched thus extending applied models in various 
directions.  
The latest technology trend for in-vehicle routing and navigation systems 
combines advanced traveler information systems with advanced vehicle control systems 
in semi autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles. This effectively shifts in-vehicle 
routing and navigation systems from a decision automation to an action implementation 
technology (Parasuraman et al. 2000). This combination of intelligent transportation 
technologies and subsequent switch to action implementation automation is outside the 
scope of this review, but should be considered when designing future generation in-
vehicle routing and navigation systems that are fully integrated into autonomous vehicle 
systems. Recent studies on trust in autonomous vehicles focus on the combined effect of 
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this technological merge (Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014; Koo et al., 2015). There may 
be a benefit to isolating advanced traveler information systems and advanced vehicle 
control systems to determine their effects more accurately separately and combined. As 
the field continues to expand and semi autonomous vehicles become mainstream and 
accessible, it is expected that new models for trust will continue to appear and be 
empirically validated per the recognized pattern above.   
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Important Related Works  
Decision Aids  
Decision support systems are fundamental to decision aiding in a number of 
complex decision environments, and are especially critical in high-risk military command 
and control tasks (Crocoll & Coury, 1990). How aids are presented to the user on the 
interface level is still in question. Should the decision aid select alternatives and 
determine the action to be taken; or should the decision aid present status information 
about the situation and leave the decision in the hands of the human? Researchers across 
multiple domains have tested various types and levels of these systems. Most decision 
support aids fall within the mid-range levels of the Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wicken’s 
framework, indicating that the operator must decide on the action with status information 
or a suggested course of action from automation. 
Crocoll and Coury (1990) revealed the influence of decision aids and how each 
type, status, and recommendation impacts performance and strategy. Their research 
demonstrated that decision aids do have an impact on decision-making performance. 
They found that the presentation of status or recommendation information significantly 
reduced the time required to identify the target and make a decision. The decrease was 
significant and the groups who were assisted by the decision aid were approximately 
three times faster than the control group. Given that decision aiding was found to be 
significantly better than no aid, the question of selecting the appropriate decision aiding 
information rose in importance (Crocoll & Coury, 1990). 
The following three areas were examined in an attempt to determine the best type 
of decision information: (a) accuracy and response times for each information type at the 
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different levels of accuracy of the decision aid, (b) the subject’s strategy selection, and (c) 
the subject’s comments. There were four decision aid conditions: a control group where 
no decision-aiding information was provided; a second group that received only status 
information; a group that received only recommendation information; and a fourth group 
that received both status and recommendation information. Results indicated that, in 
general, providing decision-aiding information reduced the time required to complete the 
task. Differences among the three types of decision-aiding information occurred under 
those conditions when the decision aid was incorrect. When the decision aid provided 
inaccurate information, the group receiving only status information was least affected by 
the decision aid and was best able to correctly identify the aircraft (Crocoll & Coury, 
1990). 
This study provides us with pivotal information about the importance of decision 
aid accuracy (henceforth known as reliability), and opens the door for further research on 
trust in decision support systems for highly critical tasks where responsibility of decision 
error still falls with the human operator.  
When discussing decision aids in the context of trust, it is important to mention 
works on workload, complacency, and situation awareness. Workload in this instance is 
synonymous with cognitive load and is essentially a form of cognitive arousal, whether it 
be memory and/or attention based. Workload must be designed to be appropriate for the 
task that is to be performed. Biros, Daly, & Gunsch (2004) wanted to know how a user’s 
task load level affects the relationship between user trust and automation use. They 
believed task load would be a moderator to the positive relationship of trust and 
automation use. Through recording performance of command and control tasks, they 
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found that the use of system’s automation is directly and positively related to level of 
perceived trust the person puts in the system. Increased task load may lead to user over-
reliance on automation decision support systems despite lower perceived trust in the 
system (Biros et al., 2004). This shows that users rely on information technology even 
when its veracity is in question.  
Overreliance on automation as a decision solution to minimize workload leads to 
issues such as complacency. If reliability is high but not perfect, human operators may 
not monitor the automation and its information systems and therefore may not detect 
failures (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2010). Complacency is said to be a 
contributing factor in situation awareness. Situational awareness refers to how 
automation of decision-making functions may reduce a human operator’s awareness of 
the system. A lack of situation awareness is related to what Endsely and Kiris (1995) call 
the “out-of-the-loop performance decrement”. Researchers ran a 30-trial within subjects 
study during which participants participated in a dynamical decision-making task under 
various conditions of automation support that would fail at random. Researchers found 
that subjects were more confident in their decisions when they were operating with 
increased automation assistance. Upon automation failure, lower levels of performance 
and situation awareness were recorded (Endsely & Kiris, 1995). This was thought to be 
caused by complacency, thus confirming its relationship to the out-of-the-loop 
performance problem. 
 
Cognitive processes in trusting decision aids.  Trust could possibly be obtained 
through the proper design of training and user interfaces that would provide information 
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regarding the automation process performance and purpose. The simple act of having this 
information is not enough to ensure that the appropriate amount of trust is gained. This is 
due to the fact that trust is developed via an underlying cognitive process and must be 
presented in a way that coincides with said process. It is through Lee and See (2004) that 
we can ascertain three of these processes: analogical, analytic, and affective (or 
emotional). Just as in name, each differs in ways of cognitive processing (Duez, Zuliani, 
& Jamieson, 2006). 
When considering the analytic process, we find that the user’s previous 
experience, knowledge, and mental model provide the basis for information processing. 
The motives, interests, behavior, and capabilities of the other party are all factored into 
this decision making process. The highest amount of cognitive resources is required from 
the human operator when adjusting for analytical trust. In contrast, analogical judgement 
is procedural and rule oriented, leaving the human operator with less cognitive demand. 
The rule-based expectations of analogical judgement pairing with the situation can 
increase a person's overall expectation of satisfactory performance. Reputation and gossip 
also hold bearing when contemplating analogical trust (Atoyan, Duquet, & Robert, 2006). 
Finally, affective aspects of trust represent how feeling and behavior can play a 
part in the core influence of trust. The feelings and emotions of an individual can 
influence the base judgement of any technology or activity. Affective association an 
impression can be equally, if not more, efficient that the simple weighing of pros and 
cons based off memory of relative information. This is especially true when mental 
resources are limited or the complexity of a decision or judgement is increased (Slovic et 
al., 2004). 
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Trust building also holds a temporal dimension. The development of trust can 
happen via, training, self-experience, hearsay, or the experience of others. It is in these 
instances that Miller (2005) recognizes that the analytic process can falter in importance 
when compared with the human interaction of the affective and analogical processes, 
especially when the system is novel in nature. Affective information may be the only 
source when considering the first time use of a novel system. With no background 
information of the agent’s past behavior or motives, trust can only be ascertained through 
what affect, or feeling, a system provides. If the affect on the human operator is 
intolerably negative, prompting a response of “do not trust”, the odds of further 
information gathering are significantly decreased. If only a small or moderate amount of 
affective trust tuning is needed, an operator will continue to use the system. This further 
use and familiarity will allow trust to be developed through the analogical process. It is 
through assertion and archiving of these two trust processes that analytical trust can begin 
to build (Miller, 2005). Essentially, the adjusting of analogic and affective processes will 
play a larger part than that of memory, logic, and experience associated with the 
analytical process. 
Miller and Parasuraman’s findings (2004) show that the user’s trust in a system is 
greatly due to the machine etiquette itself, especially when dealing with complex 
systems. We define machine etiquette as the accepted behavior, predefined roles, and the 
interactions of the system with operators, humans and intelligent agent participants, in a 
common area (Miller, 2005). These experiments show that, even in reliable systems, the 
trust and performance are lowered when the automation etiquette is poor. It is pointed out 
by Lee and See (2004) that the good etiquette of a system can support both analogical and 
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affective trust tuning development. 
 
Importance of Information Reliability   
Information and system aid reliability are often difficult to calculate. This is 
because it is often based on mean automation accuracy over time and designed for 
contexts other than the real context in which the operator will use it. This factor is 
important to consider, because it is known to impact user trust in the system and can 
therefore undermine its performance benefits. 
Wang, Jamieson, and Hollands (2009) studied the effectiveness of using system 
reliability information to support appropriate trust and reliance on a Combat 
Identification System (CID) aid. The simulated command and control task is meant to 
closely resemble the high-risk, highly critical decision environment of combat. In the 
study, aid reliability was manipulated and three conditions were tested: no aid, 67%, and 
80% aid. Aid reliability disclosure was also considered, that is, whether the participants 
were informed or not informed of the aid’s reliability level. Trust and reliance were 
collected via questionnaire and performance was measured by error rate and response 
time. Ultimately, Wang et al. (2009) found that low cost of reliance means less disuse. 
The appropriateness of reliance is dependent on reliability knowledge (resulting from aid 
disclosure) of the system. This means that users will adjust reliance more appropriately 
when informed of the reliability levels and imperfect automation can actually improve 
CID performance. 
In a slightly different domain, Madhavan and Phillips (2010) had participants 
complete a luggage screening visual search task with the assistance of an automated 
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decision support system that varied in reliability from moderately reliable (70%) to 
highly reliable (90%). The second independent variable of interest in this study was 
computer self-efficacy (CSE). This concept is a subset of expertise in that it is defined as 
a person’s judgment of his/her ability to use a computer that is essentially perceived as 
directed expertise (Madhavan & Phillips, 2010). The goal was to examine the relationship 
between CSE, and trust and utilization of the system. High-CSE participants trusted the 
system more, complied with it more, and generated significantly more hits than low-CSE 
participants, particularly on trials in which the aid was highly reliable. The results 
indicated that high-CSE levels led to a better ability to gauge the true capabilities of the 
system. However, all participants consistently underestimated the actual reliability of the 
system at both levels of CSE (Madhavan & Phillips, 2010). 
In a less critical domain, Kantowitz, Hanowski, and Kantowitz (1997) measured 
the relationship of trust and self-confidence to driver acceptance of automated traffic 
information systems (ATIS). This study was designed to provide data that would aid the 
ATIS designers in selecting an appropriate level of system accuracy (reliability). Two 
traffic routes were given to participants; one was a “familiar network” and the other was 
a “new city.” Information accuracy was set at 100%, 71%, or 43%, and the authors found 
that drivers with low self-confidence in unfamiliar settings would accept and trust less 
accurate information. Kantowitz et al. (1997) defined confidence as how sure a person 
was in decision-considering factors such as expertise. Other important trust-related 
findings from this study include: (a) trust in the system is higher when information is 
accurate, (b) trust could be recovered if accurate information is presented on subsequent 
links, and (c) inaccurate information decreases trust more in familiar settings. Essentially, 
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when self-confidence is greater than trust, manual control is preferred (Kantowitz et al., 
1997). 
 
Anthropomorphism   
Anthropomorphism occurs when any entity is given human-like qualities. 
Implementation of anthropomorphism within technology can be manifested in many 
ways, including: visually (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, and Sturre, 2012), through language 
and sound (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004; Nass & Lee, 2001), and physical shape (Lee, 
Jung, Kim, & Kim, 2006). 
Pak et al. (2012) found that for younger adults, subjective trust and objective 
behavioral trust were significantly lower when presented with a non-anthropomorphic aid 
compared to an anthropomorphized aid. Objective behavioral trust was measured through 
peek behavior, where participants had the option to reveal four possible answers. This 
behavior was specifically related to the authors’ defined concept of dependency as a form 
of reliance on automation. Pak et al. also discovered that participant answer time was 
reduced with the use of an anthropomorphic aid. The authors concluded that increased 
trust leads to increased dependence on the aid, which in turn leads to faster performance 
(Pak et al., 2012). 
Parasuraman and Miller (2004) studied the effects of automated information 
delivery in terms of etiquette, or machine politeness. They discovered that non-
personified machine etiquette strongly affected human trust, usage decisions, and human-
automation system performance. Good automation etiquette enhanced diagnostic 
performance, regardless of automation reliability; its effects overcame low reliability. 
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Another example of etiquette-affected trust in automation comes from Nass and Lee 
(2001). Nass and Lee found that in order to maximize liking and trust, designers should 
set parameters that create a personality that is consistent with the user and the content 
being presented. These parameters may include qualities such as words per minute and 
frequency range. 
Research in the area of anthropomorphism has also demonstrated that a robot’s 
personality may be a trust factor in complex domains such as manufacturing and aviation. 
Humans trust a polite and friendly automated system; this can compensate for low 
reliability in terms of the development of trust in high criticality automation (Oleson et 
al., 2011). Part of automation taking on human-like qualities is the idea of the operator 
craving a sense of social presence in the interaction. This begs the question, is physical 
embodiment required for successful social interaction between humans and social robots? 
In a more physical interpretation of anthropomorphism, Lee (2006) discovered that 
physical embodiment of a social agent without tactile interaction can negatively affect 
participants’ feelings of social presence. While trust was not measured in Lee’s study, 
there is some merit in tactile interaction with an agent so strongly affecting psychosocial 
constructs. 
More recently, computer etiquette suggests that recognizing and understanding 
the interactions of social and work context with the roles of the computer and human to 
specify acceptable behavior, can enhance human-computer interactions (Parasuraman & 
Miller, 2004). In high criticality domains, etiquette exhibited by non-personified 
machines and computer-based automation (such as facial expressions, speech, voice 
tones, and gestures) can overwhelmingly affect users’ perceptions and the correct, 
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optimal usage of them (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). Parasuraman & Miller (2004) 
hypothesized that good etiquette could compensate for poor reliability and result in 
increased usage decisions. They tested this in a 2x2 flight simulator study using low 
(45%) and high levels (70%) of reliability and low and high etiquette, they found that 
machine etiquette could strongly affect human trust, usage decisions, and human-
automation system performance. Good automation etiquette enhanced diagnostic 
performance, regardless of automation reliability. The effects of etiquette overcame low 
reliability, and performance of good etiquette/low reliability was almost as good as high 
reliability/low etiquette (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004). 
Perhaps the greatest example of a failed anthropomorphic aid to date is 
Microsoft’s “Clippy”. Clippy was a semi-anthropomorphic paper clip that provided tips 
and help to Microsoft Office users in the 1990s and early 2000s. Stanford professor Cliff 
Nass was hired by Microsoft to determine why their automated helper aid was so hated. 
In their book, “The Man Who Lied to His Laptop” Nass and Yen (2010) explain that 
Clippy defied most acceptable social conventions in trusting human to human 
relationships. Clippy gave frequent and unhelpful information, was persistently annoying, 
and used formal language to address users. Nass created and tested a “Clippy 2.0” which 
employed the use of a scapegoat bonding Clippy and the user against the common enemy 
of Microsoft. Research found a drastic change of heart in Microsoft Office users between 
the two versions of Clippy. Clippy 2.0 was extremely well-received, but due to the self-
deprecating nature of Nass’ solution to making Clippy more lovable, it was never 
implemented (Nass & Yen, 2010). Generally speaking, productivity and acceptance are 
likely enhanced with designs that consider affect (Norman, Ortony, & Russell, 2003). But 
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in the case of Clippy, the designed affect was not implemented correctly and was 
therefore detrimental to use (Nass & Yen, 2010). Together this research suggests that the 
emotional and attitudinal factors that influence human-human relationships may also 
contribute to human-automation relationships. Additionally, properly executed 
anthropomorphism makes all the difference in how humans interact with automation.  
 
Figure 19. Clippy. Adapted from The man who lied to his laptop: What we can learn 
about ourselves from our machines, by Nass, C., 2010. 
 
Realism 
In trying to conceptualize realism as a graphical communication form, knowledge 
was sought from the domain of comics and the works of Scott McCloud. In his book 
Understanding Comics, McCloud says, “When pictures are more abstracted from reality 
they require greater levels of perception, more like words”. McCloud addressed the many 
categorizing factors associated with realism, stating that imagery can be placed on many 
scales from realistic to iconic, complex to simple, objective to subjective, and specific to 
  
47 
universal. Ultimately, he claimed that words are the ultimate abstraction leaving most to 
the reader’s mind (McCloud, 1991).  
McCloud continued to parse out communicative imagery in a thought provoking 
way. A photorealistic picture of a human is a close approximation of what the retina 
would receive if looking at a real person. The meaning of the photo is therefore attained 
by way of resemblance to reality. While cartoon imagery is stripped of details or has 
exaggerated features which moves the perceiver away from resemblance, it still manages 
to convey that basic meaning. According to McCloud (1991), the continuum from 
realistic to cartoon images represents increasing levels of what he calls iconic abstraction. 
Iconic abstraction is defined as “removing an image from its retinal source, but still 
retaining its basic meaning”. When iconic abstraction is expressed at its fullest, it results 
in a compilation of pure shapes, colors, and lines, almost completely devoid from 
meaning. When you connect the lines, you get a “Big Triangle” that aims to 
systematically place imagery based on the three aforementioned components of realism, 
abstraction, and meaning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
Figure 20. Big Triangle. Reprinted from Understanding comics: The invisible art (52), 
by McCloud, S., 1993. 
 
Bringing image realism back to the field of Human Factors is a study by Yeh and 
Wickens (2001) that evaluated scene realism in an augmented reality cue detection task. 
The realism of the graphic images used were hypothesized to influence reliance on 
automation cuing. Few studies have empirically studied how the distribution of attention 
within a display is affected by image or scene detail, or how the reality with which the 
information is displayed biases operators to trust one data source over another. One 
example of empirically tested image quality also with a cueing task is a study by 
MacMillan, Entin, and Serfaty (1994) who showed that when image quality is poor, 
operators under trust cuing information. For Yeh and Wickens (2001) high realism did 
not ultimately promote greater trust. In the highly realistic setting, participants were more 
conservative in their responses and less willing to report a target. Most importantly, it 
was found that realism did influence reliance on the automated cuing information. The 
findings replicated by MacMillan et al. (1994), suggested that operators would over rely 
on automation when the image quality was high.   
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Study 1  
Methods 
Automated decision aids span multiple domains and risk environments. For this 
study, low risk routing and navigation decisions were used to evaluate the effect of 
anthropomorphism on various aspects of trust and performance using the automated 
decision aid. Specifically, a prototyped automated traveler information system (ATIS) 
will provide status and decision information on route selection for dynamic navigational 
environments. 
       
Experimental design.  This study was a 2×3×2 mixed factor design. Independent 
variables included the level of information reliability (2 levels: 72%, 90%), 
anthropomorphic aid image (3 levels: non, low, high) and advice type (2 levels: good, 
bad). We also included a separate control group that had no automated decision aid. 
Dependent variables were performance (task time, proportion of correct responses, 
confidence in decision) and trust (objective, subjective trust). Separate mixed factor 
ANOVAs were run to test the below null hypotheses for the two experimental dependent 
variables: 
H1 Level of information reliability alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance)  
H2 Level of anthropomorphic image alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance) 
H3 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance)  
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H4 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and information reliability do not interact 
to influence human trust (and performance)  
H5 Levels of information reliability and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance)  
H6 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance)  
H7 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery, information reliability, and aid advice 
type all do not interact to influence human trust (and performance)  
    
Anthropomorphism.  The main manipulation of interest is anthropomorphism, 
which is defined as having human-like qualities. This is most commonly portrayed 
through visual and auditory channels. It can include anything from human-like shapes, 
sounds, and facial features, to etiquette and humor. First we must consider the base form 
of what is taking on human characteristics. Characters in animated films are excellent 
examples of object-based anthropomorphism. In the 1991 Disney feature film Beauty and 
the Beast, household objects are given voices and faces, making them appear human-like. 
Pixar similarly personified automotive vehicles in the 2006 movie, Cars. Human-like 
traits can also be imposed on animals. Again, animated films such as Disney’s Robin 
Hood (1973), and Pixar’s Finding Nemo (2003) both exemplify animal-based 
anthropomorphism. Human cartoonism is an additional base form or anthropomorphism 
in which human drawings are given life-like human characteristics. The extent to which 
these attributes are humanized determines the level of anthropomorphism on a linear 
spectrum of realism. 
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For the purpose of this study, to be fully anthropomorphized is to be human. In 
terms of visual imagery, this is most commonly represented as a photograph of an actual 
person. A non-anthropomorphic image is one where no human attributes are found. 
Previous studies have evaluated the full presence and absence of anthropomorphism in 
imagery on trust in information decision aids (Pak et al., 2012). None have evaluated any 
mid-range visual anthropomorphism. Societal exploitation of mid-range 
anthropomorphism over the years could lead to more accepting socio-emotive feelings 
towards anything with human-like features. A real human image is not relatable because 
it is clearly not the viewer. An inanimate object is not relatable because it is non-human. 
However, something in the middle may be easier for a viewer to map themselves to. This 
study focuses on the evaluation of mid-range visual anthropomorphism with human-
computer trust. Through this we can better understand the space of visual 
anthropomorphism and the intricacies of how humans relate to and accept 
anthropomorphized automation decision aids. 
The current study evaluates three anthropomorphic conditions: (a) non-
anthropomorphic, (b) low anthropomorphic, and (c) high anthropomorphic. The non-
anthropomorphic condition includes imagery of an object relating to the domain; in this 
case, a traffic cone. The low anthropomorphic condition is an object-based cartoon 
abstraction of the traffic cone to include a face, arms, and legs. The high 
anthropomorphic condition is a human-based cartoon loosely based on a gender 
ambiguous traffic cop. The goal is to keep domain specificity as a constant across all 
image conditions which was not apparent in the design of Pak et al. The implied expertise 
  
52 
of domain-specific imagery is an important confounding factor which should be 
controlled.  
A pilot test was conducted on a series of images in an internet distributed survey 
(n = 40). The survey including other domain specific image variations such as a traffic 
light and cartoon chauffeur, and tested for perceived levels of anthropomorphism, gender 
neutrality, and intelligence. Based on the results, we selected three images for non, low, 
and high anthropomorphic aid images as depicted in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21. Anthropomorphic images (non, low, high) 
 
 
    
Reliability.  Two levels of reliability are used that assume a practical rather than 
theoretical model of ATIS testing. Pursuant to previous studies of trust in decision aids, a 
slightly greater than 70% reliability condition was selected to represent the average of 
moderate-level reliability domains. This number encompasses both a realistic minimal 
viable value for adequate decision aid use (i.e., minimizing disuse and misuse), and is 
thought to promote appropriate levels of human trust in the system. The second reliability 
condition will be set at 90% in keeping with the Federal Highway Administration’s 
(FHA) estimated system accuracies of current ATIS (Toppen & Wunderlich, 2003). 
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Aid reliability refers to the system accuracy over time, therefore 72% reliability 
condition includes 11 failures out of 40 trials, and the 90% reliability condition includes 
four failures out of 40 trials. Failures are an output of inaccurate decision aid information. 
Participants will be given feedback on whether they are “on time”, or “late” which will 
serve as route choice confirmation.  
 
Good vs bad advice.  While reliability is viewed holistically as the total 
percentage of non-failures in a condition (e.g., 72% and 90%), within each condition 
there are a certain number tasks designed to succeed and fail. These tasks will be referred 
to as good advice and bad advice, respectively. Good advice occurs the majority of the 
time in both reliability conditions and feeds the participant truthful advice on which route 
to take. Agreeing with good advice will always get the participant to the destination on 
time. Bad advice is when the decision aid feeds the user wrongful advice. That is, it tells 
the participant to take a route that is not the most efficient. Complying with wrong advice 
will always cause the participant to be late for that given task. Therefore, an 
advantageous performance outcome for bad advice trials occurs when the participant 
disagrees with the bad advice. The order of good and bad advice trials was determined 
randomly, but within a few trust building parameters following best practices for human 
interaction with new technology. All training trials contained good advice, the first 12 
trials contained only good advice to allow for initial trust in the system, no more than two 
bad advice trials occurred in a row, no more than ten good advice trials occurred in a row 
(aside from the original 12 used to build initial trust in the system). 
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Dependent measures.  Dependent variables were measured after each trial. 
Performance-based metrics included task time, proportion correct responses, and 
confidence in the chosen answer. In addition, for the conditions with a decision aid, 
subjective and objective trust in the aid were assessed. 
Participant’s behavior (whether they agree, disagree, or peek) was analyzed and 
used as an ‘objective’ measure of trust. The rationale is that if participants immediately 
agree with the aid without peeking, that could be considered a high level of trust in the 
aid. However, if participants disagree without peeking, it would indicate a complete lack 
of trust. If participants peek before making a decision it could represent moderate levels 
of trust. Behavioral trust is a scale from one to four used by Pak et al (2012). If 
participants immediately click disagree, a value of one (no trust) will be given. If they 
peek and eventually click disagree, that trial will be assigned a two (moderate distrust). 
Peeking and agreeing will be assigned a three (trust but verify), and clicking agree 
assigned a four (trust). 
If trust is the attitude, reliance is the behavior and can be measured using 
objective task performance measures. The combination of time on task and decision 
selection are frequently used to determine reliance. Reliance may be appropriate when 
operators trust automation that is either reliable or more reliable than manual operation, 
or inappropriate when operators trust automation that is either inaccurate or less reliable 
than manual operation (Dzindolet et al., 2003). 
A series of surveys, including a brief demographic survey, followed the empirical 
testing. Substantial evidence demonstrates that trusting tendencies, considered as a 
personality trait, can be reliably measured and can influence behavior in a systematic 
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manner. Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale was administered to help differentiate people 
on their propensity to trust others. People with a high propensity to trust fared better in 
predicting others’ trustworthiness than those with a low propensity to trust (Kikuchi, 
Wantanabe, & Yamasishi, 1996). Since trust in automation theorists have shown 
interpersonal trust to be related but not equivalent, the Jian et al. trust in automation scale 
was used to measure subjective trust in automation for this study. Additionally, a baseline 
of perceived anthropomorphism was assessed via survey adapted from Epley, Akalis, 
Waytz, & Cacioppo (2008). People who identify as being lonely are more likely to have a 
higher baseline for perceived anthropomorphism. To help sort through individual 
differences, a personality assessment was given. The BFAS was used to identify some 
big five traits related to the decision actions and preferences of participants (i.e., 
neuroticism and performance).  
     
Participants, procedure, and analytic plan.  The study took place at the 
University of Minnesota – Twin Cities campus. A total of 106 university students 
participated (34 male, 72 female, average age 20.5) for course credit or cash 
compensation. The data from one male participant was excluded on the basis of self 
reported city familiarity discovered in the demographic survey. The data were replaced 
with that of another male participant resulting in 105 usable participants (33 male, 72 
female, average age 20.5). All participants were tested individually in a single 
experimental session lasting about 90 minutes.  
Figure 22 illustrates the procedural flow. Participants in each condition were 
provided with a total of 40 tasks, each pertaining to a unique map of an unfamiliar 
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metropolitan area. There were five different maps used throughout the study, with eight 
consecutive tasks per map. Participants received a physical map with realistic information 
about the area including general traffic trends. Then participants received a task notecard 
with a brief written scenario such as the following: “It’s currently 8:40AM, you have an 
exam on campus at 9:00AM. Which route should you take?” A practice map and four 
practice tasks were used as training for the experimental trials.  
 
Figure 22. Process 
 
In all conditions except the control, the participant was directed to click through 
the prototype on the iPhone (automated decision aid) and decide to accept or reject the 
suggested route from the aid. The aid presented an accurate or inaccurate 
recommendation (termed “good advice” or “bad advice” respectively) to the participant 
paired with some level of anthropomorphic image. The participant could accept or reject 
the aid suggestion or choose to view more information. The “view more information” 
provided the participant with a visual traffic overlay for the routes which always reflected 
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accurate traffic information for the task at hand. After accepting or rejecting, the 
participant was directed to verbally rate the degree of confidence they had in their 
decision on a scale of 1-10. The next screen on the aid then visually displayed either an 
“on time” or “late” confirmation message. After all eight tasks for one map were 
completed, participants were asked to rate their overall level of trust in the automated 
decision aid on a scale of 1-10. This process was repeated for the remaining four map 
scenarios. 
Once all 40 tasks were completed, participants were asked to complete post-task 
surveys including but not limited to demographic information, questions concerning the 
perceived anthropomorphic mental state qualities (e.g., good intent) of each participant's 
assigned smartphone image (not applicable for the no-aid control condition), and 
personality assessments. Sessions involving the smartphone were both audio and screen 
recorded using QuickTime and saved locally to a secured lab computer. The stimuli were 
created with InVision prototyping software. Researchers entered experimental data in real 
time as participants received feedback on the decisions, indicated confidence levels, as 
well as rated trust in the automation aid. After each participant, researchers coded the 
time data by watching and listening to the session recordings.   
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Figure 23. Stimuli in order of appearance 
 
 
     
 
Results  
Dependent variables were organized into two main categories pertaining to 
anthropomorphic image manipulation (no-aid control, non-anthropomorphic aid, low 
anthropomorphic aid, and high anthropomorphic aid). Performance measures (time to 
decision, correctness of decision, confidence in answer) were assessed in all four 
conditions. Trust variables (subjective and objective trust) only applied to the three aid 
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conditions. Both behavioral and self-report data were evaluated for each of the two 
dependent variable categories. 
 
Performance.  A 2 (reliability, between) ×3 (anthropomorphism, between) ×2 
(advice type, within) mixed factor ANOVA was run using the nlme package in R. This 
analysis revealed a significant interaction of reliability and advice (F(1, 84) = 9.03, p = 
.0035). Subjects in both reliability conditions performed equally well when receiving 
good advice, but subjects in the 90% reliability condition performed worse when 
receiving bad advice than subjects in the 72% reliability condition. As shown in Figures 3 
and 4, the effects of bad advice were more pronounced for the 90% reliability condition 
(M = .92 and M = .55 for good vs bad advice, or a difference of .37) than for the 72% 
reliability condition (M = .91 and M = .71 for good vs bad advice, or a difference of .20). 
We found no significant interactions of reliability, anthropomorphism, and advice, F < 1, 
reliability and anthropomorphism, F < 1, or anthropomorphism and advice, F < 1. The 
control condition showed M = .40 for proportion correct across all trials without the help 
of an automation aid. 
A significant main effect of advice type was seen (F(1, 84) = 108.77, p < .001) 
with higher correct responses for good advice (M = .92) than for bad advice (M = .63). 
There was no effect of image type (F = 1.51) and no reliability condition and image type 
interaction (F < 1). However, overall performance was numerically greater in the high 
anthropomorphic condition than in the no anthropomorphism condition both for the 72% 
reliability condition (M = .83 vs M = .78 for high and no anthropomorphism respectively) 
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and for the 90% reliability condition (M = .77 vs M = .69 respectively). Medians are also 
reported due to the relatively low number of trials in which bad advice was given.  
Table 6. Performance Summary Tables 
Performance Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Anthro Low-Anthro High-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 0.91 
(.09) 
0.91 
(.09) 
0.93 
(.09) 
Bad Advice 0.65 
(.27) 
0.76 
(.24) 
0.72 
(.24) 
Ninety 
Percent 
Good Advice 0.90 
(.11) 
0.92 
(.07) 
0.94 
(.06) 
Bad Advice 0.48 
(.35) 
0.57 
(.26) 
0.60 
(.25) 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Proportion Correct Data  
 
 
There was a significant rank order correlation (rs = -.38, p < .001) between the 
behavioral time to decision data and self-reported confidence. Participants who required 
more time to decide were significantly less confident in the decision to accept or reject all 
aid advice types. 
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Trust.  Objective trust is a behavioral measure of trust (whether participants 
agree, disagree or view traffic layer screen) as first used by Pak et al. Objective trust was 
coded on a scale from 1 to 4. If participants immediately clicked disagree that was given 
a value of 1 (distrust). If participants viewed the hint screen and eventually clicked 
disagree, that trial was assigned a 2 (moderate distrust). Viewing the hint screen and 
agreeing was assigned a 3 (trust but verify) and immediately clicking agree was given a 
value of 4 (trust).  
Analyses revealed a significant main effect of advice (F(1, 84) = 173.01, p < .001) 
showing higher objective (behavioral) trust for good advice trials (M = 3.06) than for bad 
advice trials (M = 2.37). No other main effects or interactions were observed. 
Numerically, the non-anthropomorphic condition showed higher objective trust (M = 
2.82) than the other conditions. This pattern was found for both the 90% reliability 
condition (non-anthropomorphic M = 2.93 compared with M = 2.67 and M = 2.70 for 
high and low anthropomorphic respectively) and also for the 72% reliability condition 
(non-anthropomorphic M = 2.70 compared with M = 2.63 for both the high and low 
anthropomorphic images). 
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Table 7. Objective Trust Summary Tables 
Objective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Anthro Low-Anthro High-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 3.07 
(0.63) 
3.01 
(0.59) 
3.02 
(0.54) 
Bad Advice 2.47 
(0.87) 
2.35 
(0.70) 
2.39 
(0.68) 
Ninety 
Percent 
Good Advice 3.16 
(0.79) 
3.01 
(0.49) 
3.06 
(0.49) 
Bad Advice 2.85 
(0.99) 
2.50 
(0.68) 
2.48 
(0.75) 
 
 
Figure 25. Objective Trust Data 
 
 
An analysis of subjective trust was conducted using a 2×3 mixed factor ANOVA, 
set up with a random within-subjects effect of trial. Subjective trust was measured by 
means of verbal self-report after completion of every eight tasks thus eliminating the aid 
advice factor (see Figure 25). This analysis revealed a significant effect of reliability 
(F(1, 84) = 24.78, p < .001). Participants in the 90% reliability condition reported 
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significantly higher subjective trust than participants in the 72% reliability condition. No 
significant effect of anthropomorphism (F(2, 84) = 1.72, p = .185) or interaction (F(2, 84) 
= 1.19, p = .31) were found.  
 
Table 8. Subjective Trust Summary Table 
Subjective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Non-Anthro Low-Anthro High-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
6.72 
(1.19) 
7.25 
(0.99) 
7.52 
(0.65) 
Ninety  
Percent 
8.23 
(0.98) 
8.04 
(0.96) 
8.37 
(1.13) 
 
Figure 26. Subjective Trust Data 
 
 
Additionally, a correlation was conducted on the objective and subjective 
measures of trust revealing a significant positive correlation r = .23, (t(88) = 2.26, p = 
.027).  
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In summary, the null hypotheses and results are listed below: 
H1 Level of information reliability alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance) was accepted 
H2 Level of anthropomorphic image alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance) was accepted 
H3 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance) 
was rejected 
H4 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and information reliability do not interact 
to influence human trust (and performance) was accepted 
H5 Levels of information reliability and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance) was rejected 
H6 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance) was accepted 
H7 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery, information reliability, and aid advice 
type all do not interact to influence human trust (and performance) was accepted 
 
Discussion  
The main results of this study show that without including an image of a person, 
participants do not significantly alter trust in an automated anthropomorphized aid even 
when there is a 18% difference in aid reliability. However, we found a strong 
performance interaction of advice type and information reliability, which will be referred 
to as “compliance”. Compliance with bad advice significantly increased for participants 
in the 90% condition which supports literature in the field on the prevalence of 
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automation overreliance for highly accurate systems (Kantowitz et al, 1997; Lee & 
Moray, 1992; Muir & Moray, 1996). Overreliance is a term that suggests higher levels of 
compliance for bad advice due to human complacency after complying with a large sum 
of good advice. This finding confirms that overreliance is less prevalent for systems of 
lesser overall reliability.  
Other interesting results are related to analysis of good and bad advice. There was 
significantly higher objective trust for good advice trials than for bad advice trials across 
all reliability and anthropomorphic conditions. Participants exhibited more frequent 
peeking behavior to verify the advice with a visual traffic map when exposed to bad 
advice. As discussed above, participants also showed high levels of compliance with bad 
advice. While this was especially true for the 90% reliability condition as seen in the 
significant interaction between advice type and reliability, it was also true in the 72% 
condition and across all anthropomorphic conditions. The aforementioned significant 
main effect of advice type for both performance and objective trust suggests that for bad 
advice, participants were more likely to check the traffic condition for themselves and 
take the automated suggested route. They were not preemptively notified of advice type 
nor was the exposure pattern predictable. This indicates that while people may be good at 
detecting bad advice (lower objective trust), they may underestimate their expertise or 
understanding of the situation (greater time on task and lower confidence in decision) and 
choose to comply with the advice anyway.  
Findings for the measures of trust indicate that all levels of semi 
anthropomorphism as represented in this study are not held to the same perceptual and 
trust standards as an image of a real person. This aligns with results from a previous 
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study in another domain (that of medicine) that only observed a significant effect of trust 
when contrasting a fully non-anthropomorphic image with a photograph of a human 
image (Pak et al., 2012). The null results across all levels of imagery used in the present 
study raise some questions regarding the similarities and differences between 
anthropomorphism and realism as mentioned in the introduction of this paper. To explain 
the non-monotonic results among anthropomorphic conditions, we consider a possible 
perceived weirdness of the low anthropomorphic image condition. The distinctions of the 
image’s portrayed visual etiquette (e.g., it could be perceived as waving or more 
animated) may account for the peaks in the data. We partially attribute poor trust findings 
from this study to the design of the image being object-based and loosely associated with 
Microsoft’s Clippy, according to comments made by at least three participants in that 
condition. Microsoft’s animated anthropomorphized paper clip helper was discontinued 
after a plethora of negative feedback from Microsoft Office users (Nass & Yen, 2010). 
Specifically, literature on trust and etiquette indicates that users tend to trust and accept 
software more readily when it displays personality characteristics that are similar to their 
own (Reeves & Nass, 1996). From this perspective, some instances of object-based 
anthropomorphism may not be thought of as human at all despite the inclusion of human-
like features.  
Upon further exploration, the trust data show somewhat higher objective trust and 
relatedly poorer performance under bad advice trials for the non-anthropomorphic 
condition when compared to high anthropomorphic condition under 72% information 
reliability. The non-anthropomorphic aid had higher subjective trust ratings in the 72% 
reliability condition. One plausible explanation for this reversed pattern is that the non-
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anthropomorphic image of a cone is perceived as being more real than the high 
anthropomorphic depiction of a cartoon traffic cop. Additionally, an image of a human 
(not tested in this study) and a traffic cone may be considered as involving the same level 
of realism, but different levels of anthropomorphism. The disparities that exist in the trust 
literature across domains for incremental scales of anthropomorphism and realism point 
to a clear need to further understand this representational space.  
There is considerable value in these findings because behavioral and self-report 
measures were used in the study design. However, not many researchers have used the 4-
point metric of objective trust. Thus, the non-anthropomorphic condition demonstrated 
numerically greater objective trust in conjunction with numerically poorer behavioral 
performance. We realize a limitation in the 4-point objective trust as comprising a 
comparatively coarse-grained behavioral outcome measure.  
While confirming that automation of medium and high reliability is beneficial to 
human performance (when compared to no automation at all), we conclude that high 
levels of information reliability in an automated system contribute to the previously 
studied overreliance problem (Kantowitz et al, 1997; Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir & 
Moray, 1996; Pak et al., 2012; Parasuraman et al., 2000). People are able to better 
identify false information and make better advice judgements in moderately reliable 
automation environments compared with exceedingly reliable automation environments. 
Current findings on trust in visually anthropomorphic aids are likely to extend across 
domains (e.g., from a healthcare context to navigation contexts) although more research 
is needed to evaluate semi anthropomorphism with full anthropomorphism in order to 
definitively make such a claim.  
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Study 2  
Methods 
The second study was essentially a replication of process and extension of the 
first study. There were three main goals to running Study 2 as designed: First, we wanted 
to see if the Pak et al. (2012) findings held true when removed from the health/medical 
domain by including both a non-anthropomorphic and full anthropomorphic image. 
Second, we aimed to replicate findings from Study 1 between the non-anthropomorphic 
and high anthropomorphic stimuli. Third, by using the same methodology as Study 1, we 
were able to further extend the scale of anthropomorphism to encompass non-
anthropomorphic, semi anthropomorphic, and full anthropomorphic imagery. Given the 
consistency in procedure, stimuli, and population, we did not opt to include a control 
group for Study 2.       
Experimental design.  This study was a 3×2 mixed factor design. Independent 
variables included anthropomorphic aid image (3 levels: non, high, full) and advice type 
(2 levels: good, bad). Dependent variables were performance (task time, proportion of 
correct responses, confidence in decision) and trust (objective, subjective trust). Separate 
mixed factor ANOVAs were run to test the below null hypotheses for the two 
experimental dependent variables: 
H1 Level of anthropomorphic image alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance)  
H2 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance) 
H3 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance)       
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Anthropomorphism.  Study 2 evaluated three anthropomorphic conditions: (a) 
non-anthropomorphic, (b) high anthropomorphic, and (c) full anthropomorphic. The non-
anthropomorphic condition included imagery of an object relating to the domain; in this 
case, a traffic cone. The full anthropomorphic condition was a domain-specific photo of a 
female traffic reporter also considered to be domain specific. A female traffic reporter 
was selected in order to make the results more directly comparable with that of Pak et al. 
(2012). The high anthropomorphic condition was a domain-specific cartoon with a 
human base, visually derived from the human photo used in the full anthropomorphic 
condition.  
We once again pilot tested the series of images for perceived levels of 
anthropomorphism, gender neutrality, and intelligence. Based on the results, we selected 
three images for non, high, and full anthropomorphic aid as depicted in Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27. Anthropomorphic images (non, high, full) 
    
 
Reliability.  Results from the first study showed that an automation with 90% 
reliability was essentially too high to see effects for anthropomorphism or advice. The 
sensitivity of nuanced imagery was deemed more appropriate to study under the 72% 
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condition, where bad advice trials exceeded four data points. Therefore, this study kept 
reliability as a constant 72% effectively eliminating an entire condition from the first 
study. The 72% reliability condition includes 11 failures out of 40 trials where failures 
are an output of inaccurate decision aid information. Participants are given feedback on 
whether they are “on time”, or “late” which also serves as route choice confirmation. 
 
Good vs bad advice.  Trials were separated into truthful information or “good 
advice” trials, and wrongful information or “bad advice” trials. This separation is 
important to note for performance reasons. Agreeing with good advice will always get the 
participant to the destination on time. Bad advice is when the decision aid feeds the user 
wrongful advice. That is, it tells the participant to take a route that is not the most 
efficient. Complying with wrong advice will always cause the participant to be late for 
that given task. Therefore, an advantageous performance outcome for bad advice trials 
occurs when the participant disagrees with the bad advice. The order of good and bad 
advice trials was determined randomly, but within a few trust building parameters 
following best practices for human interaction with new technology. All training trials 
contained good advice, the first 12 trials contained only good advice to allow for initial 
trust in the system, no more than two bad advice trials occurred in a row, no more than 
ten good advice trials occurred in a row (aside from the original 12 used to build initial 
trust in the system). 
     
Dependent measures.  Dependent variables were measured after each trial. 
Performance-based metrics included task time, proportion correct responses, and 
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confidence in the chosen answer. In addition, for the conditions with a decision aid, 
subjective and objective trust in the aid were assessed. 
Participant’s behavior (whether they agree, disagree, or peek) were analyzed and 
used as an ‘objective’ measure of trust. The rationale is that if participants immediately 
agree with the aid without peeking, that could be considered a high level of trust in the 
aid. However, if participants disagree without peeking, it would indicate a complete lack 
of trust. If participants peek before making a decision it could represent moderate levels 
of trust. Behavioral trust is a scale from one to four used by Pak et al (2012). If 
participants immediately click disagree, a value of one (no trust) will be given. If they 
peek and eventually click disagree, that trial will be assigned a two (moderate distrust). 
Peeking and agreeing will be assigned a three (trust but verify), and clicking agree 
assigned a four (trust). 
If trust is the attitude, reliance is the behavior and can be measured using 
objective task performance measures. The combination of time on task and decision 
selection are frequently used to determine reliance. Reliance may be appropriate when 
operators trust automation that is either reliable or more reliable than manual operation, 
or inappropriate when operators trust automation that is either inaccurate or less reliable 
than manual operation (Dzindolet et al., 2003). 
A series of surveys, including a brief demographic survey, followed the empirical 
testing. Substantial evidence demonstrates that trusting tendencies, considered as a 
personality trait, can be reliably measured and can influence behavior in a systematic 
manner. Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (RITS) was administered to help differentiate 
people on their propensity to trust others. People with a high propensity to trust fared 
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better in predicting others’ trustworthiness than those with a low propensity to trust 
(Kikuchi, Wantanabe, & Yamasishi, 1996). The Jian et al. trust in automation scale was 
used to measure subjective trust in automation for this study. Additionally, a baseline of 
perceived anthropomorphism was assessed by survey adapted from Epley et al. (2008). 
People who identify as being lonely are more likely to have a higher baseline for 
perceived anthropomorphism. To help sort through individual differences, a personality 
assessment was given. The Big Five Aspect Survey (BFAS) was used to identify some 
big five traits thought to be related to the decision actions and preferences of participants 
(i.e., neuroticism and performance).      
 
Participants, procedure, and analytic plan.  The study took place at the 
University of Minnesota – Twin Cities campus. A total of 47 university students 
participated (14 male, 33 female, average age 19.5) for course credit or cash 
compensation. The data from two female participants were excluded on the basis of 
exceeding the age requirement for the study, and city familiarity which were discovered 
in the demographic survey. The data were replaced with two other female participants 
resulting in 45 usable participants (14 male, 31 female, average age 20.5). All 
participants were tested individually in a single experimental session lasting about 90 
minutes. Figure 13 illustrates the procedural flow. Participants in each condition were 
provided with a total of 40 tasks, each pertaining to a unique map of an unfamiliar 
metropolitan area. There were five different maps used throughout the study, with eight 
consecutive tasks per map. Participants received a physical map with realistic information 
about the area including general traffic trends. Then participants received a task notecard 
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with a brief written scenario such as the following: “It’s currently 8:40AM, you have an 
exam on campus at 9:00AM. Which route should you take?” A practice map and four 
practice tasks were used as training for the experimental trials.  
In all conditions except the control, the participant was directed to click through 
the prototype on a smartphone and decide to accept or reject the suggested route from the 
aid. The aid presented an accurate or inaccurate recommendation (termed “good advice” 
or “bad advice” respectively) to the participant paired with some level of 
anthropomorphic image. The participant could accept or reject the aid suggestion or 
choose to view more information. The “view more information” provided the participant 
with a visual traffic overlay for the routes which always reflected accurate traffic 
information for the task at hand. After accepting or rejecting, the participant was directed 
to verbally rate the degree of confidence they had in their decision on a scale of 1-10. The 
next screen on the aid then visually displayed either an “on time” or “late” confirmation 
message. After all eight tasks for one map were completed, participants were asked to 
rate their overall level of trust in the automated decision aid on a scale of 1-10. This 
process was repeated for the remaining four map scenarios. 
Once all 40 tasks were completed, participants were asked to complete post-task 
surveys including but not limited to demographic information, questions concerning the 
perceived anthropomorphic mental state qualities (e.g., good intent) of each participant's 
assigned smartphone image and personality assessments. Sessions involving the 
smartphone were both audio and screen recorded using QuickTime and saved locally to a 
secured lab computer. The stimuli were created with InVision prototyping software. 
Researchers entered experimental data in real time as participants received feedback on 
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the decisions, indicated confidence levels, as well as rated trust in the automation aid. 
After each participant, researchers coded the time data by watching and listening to the 
session recordings.   
 
Results  
Performance. A 3 (anthropomorphism, between) ×2 (advice type, within) mixed 
factor ANOVA was run using the nlme package in R. This analysis revealed no 
significant interaction of anthropomorphism and advice (F(2, 42)=2.282, p=.115). There 
is however a slight trend towards an interaction of anthropomorphic image condition and 
advice type. As shown in Figure 15 and Table 9, similar performance accuracy is seen 
across all levels of anthropomorphic image conditions for good advice trials with means 
for full, high, and non-anthropomorphic at .89, .92, and .93 respectively. Comparatively 
poorer performance is seen for the no anthropomorphism condition than either of the 
anthropomorphic conditions on bad advice trials. (M = .62, .64, and .51 for high, low, and 
non-anthropomorphic in that order). 
There was however a main effect of advice type, (F(1, 42)=72.851, p<.0001) with 
higher correct responses for good advice (M = .91) than for bad advice trials (M = .59). 
No main effect of anthropomorphic condition is seen. There are similar combined advice 
means for full, high, and no anthropomorphic conditions (M= .76, .78, .72 respectively).  
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Table 9. Performance Summary Tables 
Performance Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Anthro High-Anthro Full-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 0.93 
(0.05) 
0.88 
(0.12) 
0.89 
(0.08) 
Bad Advice 0.51 
(0.31) 
0.64 
(0.23) 
0.72 
(0.27) 
 
 
Figure 28. Proportion Correct Data  
 
 
 
There was a significant rank order correlation (rs = -.370, p < .0001) between the 
behavioral time to decision data and self-reported confidence. Participants who required 
more time to decide were significantly less confident in the decision to accept or reject all 
aid advice types.  
For Study 2 we additionally ran a 3 (anthropomorphic image condition) ×2 
(advice type) mixed-factor ANOVA on response time to gain a better understanding of 
time as a variable. Anthropomorphic image condition was a between-subjects factor and 
advice type was a within-subjects factor. Results showed a main effect of advice type, 
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F(1, 42) = 15.16, p < .001, with response time on good advice trials (M = 10.61) 
significantly faster than response time on bad advice trials (M = 12.03). There were no 
other significant effects of interactions to report, however, response time was longer in 
the full anthropomorphism (M= 12.07) and high anthropomorphism (M = 11.55) than in 
the non-anthropomorphism (M = 10.34).  
 
Trust.  Objective trust is a behavioral measure of trust (whether participants 
agree, disagree or view traffic layer screen) as first used by Pak et al. Objective trust was 
coded on a scale from 1 to 4. If participants immediately clicked disagree that was given 
a value of 1 (distrust). If participants viewed the hint screen and eventually clicked 
disagree, that trial was assigned a 2 (moderate distrust). Viewing the hint screen and 
agreeing was assigned a 3 (trust but verify) and immediately clicking agree was given a 
value of 4 (trust).  
Analyses revealed a significant main effect of advice type (F(1, 42) = 84.821, p < 
.0001) showing higher objective trust for good advice trials (M = 3.09) than for bad 
advice trials (M = 2.56). No other main effects or interactions were observed. For both 
good and bad advice, the non-anthropomorphic condition showed numerically higher 
objective trust (M = 2.96) than the high anthropomorphic (M = 2.71) or full 
anthropomorphic (M = 2.81) as seen in figure 16. Given numerical difference objective 
trust data, effect size was calculated to be ω2 = .027.  The reported effect sizes are Omega 
squared which corrects for the bias inherent in Eta squared, especially with small sample 
sizes. Interpretation of Omega squared is: Small = .01, medium = .06, and large = .14.  
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Table 10. Objective Trust Summary Tables 
Objective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Anthro High-Anthro Full-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 3.20 
(0.60) 
3.00 
(0.69) 
3.07 
(0.71) 
Bad Advice 2.72 
(0.84) 
2.42 
(0.90) 
2.54 
(0.91) 
 
Figure 29. Objective Trust Data 
 
 
 
An analysis of subjective trust was conducted using a one-way ANOVA. 
Subjective trust was measured by means of verbal self-report after completion of every 
eight tasks thus eliminating the aid advice factor (see Figure 29). This analysis revealed 
no significant effect of Anthropomorphism (F(2, 42) = 0.794, p = .459).  
Table 11. Subjective Trust Summary Table 
Subjective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Non-Anthro Low-Anthro High-Anthro 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
7.44 
(1.37) 
7.44 
(1.37) 
6.97 
(0.97) 
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Figure 30. Subjective Trust Data 
 
 
Additionally, a correlation was conducted on the objective and subjective 
measures of trust revealing no correlation of average trust by person (r = -0.052) which is 
not significant (t(43) = -.344, p = .733). 
 
In summary, the null hypotheses and results are listed below: 
H1 Level of anthropomorphic image alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance) accepted 
H2 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance) 
rejected 
H3 Levels of anthropomorphic imagery and aid advice type do not interact to 
influence human trust (and performance) accepted 
 
Discussion  
As previously stated, there were three main goals for this study: First, we wanted 
to see if the Pak et al. (2012) findings held true beyond the health and medical domain. 
Second, we aimed to replicate findings from Study 1 between the non-anthropomorphic 
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and high anthropomorphic stimuli. Third, by using the same methodology as Study 1, we 
are able to further extend the scale of anthropomorphism to encompass non-
anthropomorphic, semi anthropomorphic, and full anthropomorphic imagery. These items 
will be discussed in reverse order.  
The anthropomorphic scale was extended to include three categories of 
anthropomorphism (non, high, full) to be more comparable to the categorization of 
imagery used by Pak et al. (2012). Even though a slightly different high anthropomorphic 
image was used in this study than in the first study, results from both “replicated” group 
conditions (non and high anthropomorphism) showed similar results to Study 1. This not 
only contributes to the validity of the high anthropomorphic image group, but shows that 
we were consistent enough in our image creation to mitigate effects of gender bias. A 
non-monotonic outcome was still observed across the three groups; the full 
anthropomorphic condition consistently ranked between non-anthropomorphic and high 
anthropomorphic for both performance outcomes and objective trust. Based on results 
from Study 1 and now Study 2, anthropomorphism as defined by the scale used in this 
study may not actually matter or may be how aid imagery is conceptualized and 
organized by the average person.  
The most impressive results statistically are again related to analysis of good and 
bad advice. There was significantly higher objective trust for good advice trials than for 
bad advice trials across all anthropomorphic conditions. Participants exhibited more 
frequent peeking behavior to verify the advice with a visual traffic map when exposed to 
bad advice. Participants also showed high levels of compliance with bad advice. A 
significant main effect of advice type for both performance and objective trust suggests 
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that for bad advice, participants were more likely to check the traffic condition for 
themselves and take the automated suggested route. They were not preemptively notified 
of advice type nor was the exposure pattern predictable. This indicates that while people 
may be good at detecting bad advice (lower objective trust), they may underestimate their 
expertise or understanding of the situation (greater time on task and lower confidence in 
decision) and choose to comply with the advice anyway. 
 Looking more closely at the data, performance outcomes were worse for the non-
anthropomorphic group when exposed to bad advice than any other image condition. 
Additionally, objective trust and response times were highest for the non-
anthropomorphic group. With system reliability no longer a factor, we are able to explore 
the directional effects of these other contributing variables. Results begin to paint a more 
holistic picture of how imagery may contribute to the overreliance problem. The data 
suggest that when exposed to a non-anthropomorphic image, participants seem to show 
evidence of overreliance by making quicker and less accurate judgments on bad advice. 
Alternatively, lower objective trust was seen for both anthropomorphic conditions (high 
and full) leading to less compliance with bad advice which is a more favorable 
performance outcome. Based on the trends observed in these data, anthropomorphic 
imagery may lead to a more appropriate calibration of trust for humans. Given its 
statistical insignificance, more data is needed to investigate the claim. 
The claim that full anthropomorphism significantly increases trust in younger 
adults (Pak et al. 2012) when compared to a non-anthropomorphic image does not hold 
true according to the present study. While we found no significant effect of 
anthropomorphism, results showed tendencies for increased objective trust for the non-
  
81 
anthropomorphic condition. Described here are some possible explanations for difference 
in findings. Pak et al. (2012) used an image of gears to represent non-anthropomorphism 
in their study. This is problematic for a few reasons: First, an image of gears on an 
automated system may be associated with a system error (Nielsen, 1995) which could 
have skewed the results towards lower levels of trust. Second, gears have very little to do 
with the medical or health care domain. In terms of perceived expertise in a medical 
advice system, an image of gears and an image of a doctor are not comparable. Assuming 
perception of expertise is in fact an influencing factor for trust (Kantowitz et al., 1997), 
this expertise discrepancy may have also negatively affected both subjective and 
objective trust scores. From this analysis we realize that expertise may carry more weight 
than nuances in visual anthropomorphism as an influencing factor of automated aid trust. 
Perceived importance of expertise between navigation and medical domains could also 
contribute to the difference in findings. Additionally, expertise is equally attributable to 
human and non-human imagery and should be controlled for in future studies. 
The major takeaway from Study 2 is that participants who were presented with a 
non-anthropomorphic image showed (insignificant) evidence of overreliance on 
automated advice. This trend did not support the results of Pak et al. (2012) and more 
importantly showed that people may view non-anthropomorphism as being more accurate 
or knowledgeable than the full anthropomorphic human. Such a societal switch 
acknowledges the acceptance of a machine’s intelligence outweighing the advice of a 
human expert and full anthropomorphism more similarly than what was originally 
theorized. Results also further support our original call to consider regrouping 
anthropomorphic imagery as levels of realism in Study 1.  
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Self Report Survey Results and Discussion 
 With most psychologically based research, it is hard to control for extraneous 
variables within the study design. There were a few individual differences variables 
flagged at the onset of research as possibly being so confounding that they would 
overshadow the manipulations. These variables included: one’s propensity to trust both 
other people and technology, how likely one is to view an object as human-like, and 
personality aspects that would affect one’s motivation for performance. The surveys act 
as an a posteriori check of random group assignment while also providing a chance to 
further substantiate the generalizability of our sample to the greater population by 
comparing results to that of other studies.  
Participants filled out a series of self report surveys upon total task completion for 
each study. The first of which was a demographic survey that served as both a collective 
of previous navigation system experience and a disqualifying screener for participants 
who may have lied about their eligibility for the study. Of all 153 participants between 
both studies, only three people were disqualified; one for age, and two for familiarity 
driving in one or more of the cities used in the study.  
Eligible participants from both studies had an average age of 20.2 with more 
participation from women than men; 68.7% self identified as females. All 150 
participants identified as being semi experienced with a mobile navigation application. 
To assess the breakdown of familiarity with more commonly used navigation and routing 
systems in the U.S., participants rated their experience on a three-point scale. Figure 18 
shows the combined results of this survey. All participants claimed some experience with 
Google Maps which helped to even familiarity being that the color and organization 
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scheme used for the map and traffic design of the studies were most similar to Google 
Maps.  
 
Figure 31. Navigation Product Experience  
 
 
 
Interpersonal Trust vs Technological Trust 
Next, Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Score (Wrightsman, 1991) and Jian et al.’s 
Trust Between People and Automation (TBPA) scale were administered to the 135 
participants who received the smartphone aid across both studies (excluding the 15 
control group participants). People with a high propensity to trust fared better in 
predicting others’ trustworthiness than those with a low propensity to trust (Kikuchi, 
Wantanabe, & Yamasishi, 1996). Trust in automation theorists have shown interpersonal 
trust to be related but not equivalent, to trust in automation (Muir, 1989, 1994, 1996; 
Riley, 1994). A significant correlation between these two surveys is realized with r = 
.304, (t(132) = 3.671, p < .001) showing that people with a high propensity to trust also 
tend to have higher levels of trust in an automated device. 
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Figure 32. Trust Survey Correlation 
 
Further analysis was conducted on the TBPA scale for both studies comparing it 
to the empirical measure of subjective trust throughout tasks (Figure 32). There was a 
significant positive correlation between the TBPA survey and verbally measured 
subjective trust (r = .409, t(133) = 5.172, p < .0001). The strong correlation shows 
evidence of rating consistency across self report measures used in the study.  
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Figure 33. Trust Survey and Subjective Trust Correlation 
 
 
Anthropomorphic Mental State 
An Anthropomorphic Mental State survey was adapted from Epley et al. (2008). 
A baseline of perceived anthropomorphism was assessed because Epley et al. (2008) 
found that people who identified as being lonely were more likely to have a higher 
baseline for perceived anthropomorphism. How people naturally attribute human 
characteristics to nonhuman images is important to know within the context of these 
studies. Based on the instructional set for this survey administration, how human-like 
participants think the image was used to help them form a system mental state judgement. 
Therefore, a significant effect of Anthropomorphic Mental State in any one 
anthropomorphic image condition could uncover unforeseen issues with the image design 
or sampling bias. A 2 (study number, between) ×2 (reliability, between) × 4 
(anthropomorphism, between) ANOVA using Type II Sums of Squares was run using 
survey composite scores. There were no effects or interactions to report effectively ruling 
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out baseline anthropomorphic mental state as a confounding variable for the tasks 
completed. 
Table 12. Anthropomorphic Mental State Summary Tables 
 
 
Personality 
Participants completed the 100-item Big Five Aspect Scale (BFAS). It was 
predetermined to look for correlations between neuroticism (contributing aspects include 
volatility and withdrawal) and the proportion correct performance measure. Personal 
achievement falls under neuroticism which is consistently related to poor job 
performance due to its associations with low self confidence, high anxiety, hostility and 
vulnerability (Judge & Ilies, 2002). Given the performance-based motivation and reward 
structure, we felt strongly about collecting this data. Separate correlations were done for 
both good and bad advice trials. There was no correlation between neuroticism and 
performance for good advice trials (r = -.103, p = .365), or bad advice trials (r = -.064, p 
= .573). These null results further validate the measurement of performance through 
being unaffected by neuroticism.  
 
Discussion of Measured Trust 
 Four measures of trust were used in Study 1 and Study 2: Objective trust, 
subjective trust, interpersonal trust, and trust in technology. Objective trust is the 
behavioral measure of needing to verifying advice through map peeking behavior during 
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each task. Subjective trust is the verbal rating of trust in the system’s advice on a scale of 
1-10 after every eight tasks. Interpersonal trust is a 24-item scale assessing one’s 
propensity to trust other people. Trust in technology is a 12-item questionnaire that is 
used to assess human trust in a new technological system.  
Correlation results in both studies revealed interesting relationships among the 
four trust measures. Interpersonal trust positively correlated with technological trust. 
Technological trust positively correlated with subjective trust. However, subjective trust 
did not significantly correlate with objective trust. The measure we call objective trust is 
more realistically measuring reliance. Here it is important to reestablish the difference 
between the terms reliance and trust. Trust is a purely psychological state while reliance 
is dependent on action or performance. A person can rely on automation even if it is not 
trusted. For example, the user can know that the automation is likely to fail but use it 
anyway. Frequent accounts of reliance occur when the human is physically or cognitively 
overloaded. The objective measure used here is also not very adaptable beyond decision 
aid technology as it relies on a binary decision matrix for data coding, but it is a step in 
the right direction.  
More researchers should focus on finding valid and reliable behavioral measures 
for trust in automation rather than relying on various self report surveys. Assessing trust 
is similar to assessing cognitive workload, where the judgments occur and frequently 
change during a series of tasks. Asking participants to self report at the end of a task 
series relies too heavily on memory. The concept of objective trust has the potential to be 
a more accurate representation of how we make decisions to trust automated advice if it 
can truly be separated from performance.   
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Combined Empirical Analysis 
In order to explore differences between anthropomorphism and realism, image 
conditions in both studies were retroactively reclassified in terms realism. Realism was 
dichotomized into non-realistic imagery and realistic imagery. Non-realistic imagery for 
this analysis included the androgynous high anthropomorphic cartoon cop from Study 1, 
and the high anthropomorphic female cartoon traffic reporter from Study 2. Realistic 
imagery encompassed the non-anthropomorphic cone used in both studies and the full 
anthropomorphic photo of a woman traffic reporter. Data from a total of 120 participants 
were used across both studies; 75 participants from Study 1 (excluding the control group 
and low anthropomorphic group), and all 45 participants from Study 2.  
Reliability remained a constant at 72% (taken from Study 2) while good and bad 
advice were treated identically to the first two analyses. In order to rule out any 
confounding differences between studies (i.e., time, participant pool, etc.) that could be 
confused as an effect of realism, a “dummy” variable of study number was introduced 
into the analysis.  
This yielded an unbalanced 2×2×2 mixed factor design. Independent variables 
included the level of image realism (between: non-realistic, realistic), study number 
(between: Study 1, Study 2) and advice type (within: good, bad). Because there are equal 
numbers of high realism in each study, A Type II Sums of Squares is used to test for 
realism after accounting for study number, and then test for study after accounting for 
realism. Dependent variables were performance (task time, proportion of correct 
responses, confidence in decision) and trust (objective, subjective trust). Separate mixed 
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factor ANOVAs were run to test the below null hypotheses for the two experimental 
dependent variables: 
H1 Level of image realism alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance)  
H2 Study number alone does not influence human trust (and performance) 
H3 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance)  
H4 Level of image realism and advice type do not interact to influence human 
trust (and performance)  
H5 Study number and aid advice type do not interact to influence human trust 
(and performance)  
H6 Level of image realism and study number do not interact to influence human 
trust (and performance)  
H7 Level of image realism, study number, and aid advice type all do not interact 
to influence human trust (and performance)  
      
Results  
Performance.  A 2 (realism, between) ×2 (study, between) ×2 (advice type, 
within) mixed factor ANOVA was run on proportion correct responses using the nlme 
package in R. Results indicated no significant effect of study (F(1, 86) = 2.087, p = .152) 
therefore all figures in this section exclude study number as a variable. No significant 
interactions are reported. However, there is a weak and insignificant trend towards an 
interaction of realism and advice (F(1,86) = 2.696, p = .104) showing poorer performance 
for the realistic group than for the non-realistic group (M = .75 and .81, respectively). 
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Again, we saw a significant main effect of advice (F(1, 86) = 99.644, p < .0001) where 
performance was significantly higher on good advice trials (M = .91) than bad advice 
trials (M = .65). No main effect of realism was discovered with similar means for non-
realism and realism especially within good advice.  
 
Table 13. Performance Summary Tables 
Performance Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Realistic Realistic 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 0.91 
(0.10) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
Bad Advice 0.71 
(0.24) 
0.59 
(0.28) 
 
Figure 34. Proportion Correct Data  
 
 
 
Trust.  Another 2 (realism, between) ×2 (study, between) ×2 (advice type, within) 
mixed factor ANOVA was run for objective trust using the nlme package in R. Once 
again, it is important to first report no effect of study. Analyses revealed a significant 
main effect of advice (F(1, 86) = 223.729, p < .0001) showing higher objective trust for 
good advice trials (M = 3.06) than for bad advice trials (M = 2.49). No other main effects 
or interactions were observed. An insignificant trend toward a main effect of realism was 
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shown (F(1, 86) = 2.462, p = .120) where the realistic condition over combined advice 
type showed higher objective trust (M = 2.85) than the unrealistic condition (M = 2.7).  
Given the trending objective trust data, effect size was calculated to be ω2 = .010.  The 
reported effect sizes are Omega squared which corrects for the bias inherent in Eta 
squared, especially with small sample sizes. Interpretation of Omega squared is small = 
.01, medium = .06, and large = .14.  
 
Table 14. Objective Trust Summary Tables 
Objective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Aid info type Non-Realistic Realistic 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
Good Advice 3.01 
(0.61) 
3.11 
(0.65) 
Bad Advice 2.39 
(0.76) 
2.58 
(0.88) 
 
 
Figure 35. Objective Trust Data 
 
 
An analysis of subjective trust was conducted using a 2 (realism, between) ×2 
(study, between) ANOVA. Subjective trust was measured by means of verbal self-report 
after completion of every eight tasks thus eliminating the aid advice factor. This analysis 
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revealed no main effect of study, and no interaction between study number and realism. 
Interestingly, there is a significant main effect of realism (F(1, 86) = 4.410, p = .039). 
Subjective trust is lower for realistic aids (M = 7.01) than non-realistic aids (M = 7.4).  
 
Table 15. Subjective Trust Summary Table 
Subjective Trust Summary – MEANS (SD) 
Reliability Non-Realistic Realistic 
Seventy-Two 
Percent 
7.40 
(1.03) 
7.01 
(1.00) 
 
 
Figure 36. Subjective Trust Data 
 
 
 
In summary, the null hypotheses and results are listed below: 
H1 Level of image realism alone does not influence human trust (and 
performance)  
H2 Study number alone does not influence human trust (and performance) 
H3 Type of aid advice alone does not influence human trust (and performance)  
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H4 Level of image realism and advice type do not interact to influence human 
trust (and performance)  
H5 Study number and aid advice type do not interact to influence human trust 
(and performance)  
H6 Level of image realism and study number do not interact to influence human 
trust (and performance)  
H7 Level of image realism, study number, and aid advice type all do not interact 
to influence human trust (and performance)  
 
Discussion 
The non-realistic grouping was comprised of two human-based cartoon variations. 
One was a gender ambiguous traffic cop, and the other was a woman traffic reporter. 
Homogeneity of data when combined indicated comparable treatment between the 
cartoon variations which could indicate a similarity in implied domain expertise. We 
realize that given its composition, calling the group non-realistic is not really accurate. 
Instead we will refer to the grouping as “cartoon”. As discussed earlier, expertise as a 
factor may outweigh visual image treatments such as anthropomorphism and even 
realism as indicated by insignificant results across the board. However, with consistency 
in perceived expertise across image conditions we see more impressive trends when the 
data are organized by realism. 
While still not significant when grouping images by realism, performance and 
objective trust results trended more closely toward significance than the results from 
Study 1 or Study 2. Again, we see higher objective trust in realistic imagery (cone and 
female reporter photo) and poor performance when given bad advice. Participants’ 
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decisions were affected by the high levels of objective trust in the system which led to 
greater aid compliance during bad advice trials. 
Subjective trust is also significantly lower for realistic images than non-realistic 
images which aligns well with the previous reports of subjective trust. Given the 
tendency for participants in the realistic image group to be late when given bad advice, 
they could have perceived higher fault in the system thus resulting in lower post task 
subjective trust ratings.  
The higher objective trust seen in the cartoon image condition raises some 
questions. Do humans trust a cartoon in the same way as something that exists in the 
natural world? Furthermore, do humans attribute expertise with cartoons in the same way 
as “real” humans or images of the “real” tools they use? While inconclusive, we argue 
that at least in American culture, people tend to treat (and trust) cartoons in a different 
manner than real objects. We see evidence of this in the relationship observed between 
objective trust and performance. High objective trust yielded low proportion correct 
scores among bad advice trials (as seen with the cartoon image group), and low objective 
trust showed a higher performance metric for bad advice trials (seen in the realistic image 
group). Something is unexpected about how humans inherently trust and behave toward 
cartoon imagery within the context of automated navigation decision aids. The next 
chapter will include a summary findings throughout all three analyses along with research 
supported explanations for theories resulting from this body of research.  
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Summary and Recommendation for Future Work 
The objective of this project was to expand upon the existing research on human 
trust in automated decision aids by evaluating the effects of mid-range 
anthropomorphism and information reliability on system trust and performance. The 
following three main research questions were addressed and conclusions will be 
organized accordingly: 
1. What are the past and present industry practices as well as research 
advancements in designing for appropriate use and trust of navigation decision 
aids? 
2. Can level of anthropomorphism affect trust for different aid information 
reliability? 
3. How do humans behaviorally respond to visually anthropomorphized aids in a 
navigational context? 
Limitations of the studies will be discussed along with practical implications, overall 
contributions, and directions for future research. 
 
What are the past and present industry trends as well as research advancements in 
designing for appropriate use and trust of navigation decision aids? 
Based on a side-by-side temporal comparison of in-vehicle routing and navigation 
systems (IRANS) and trust in automation research, there seems to be a cyclical trend in 
research and new in-vehicle routing and navigation systems development. First comes the 
development of the new technology which immediately raises societal questions further 
propagat
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of the new technology, theoretical models are adapted to fit specific use cases, which are 
then empirically supported and become applied models. Based on results from empirical 
studies, changes are made for new products using similar technologies in order to 
improve the experience or performance. With the increasing reliability and adoption of 
technology, finer details within design and technology implementation are able to be 
researched thus extending applied models in various directions. Looking forward, as 
autonomous vehicles reach the general population, new models for trust in these systems 
containing increasing levels of automation will soon appear.  
 
Can level of anthropomorphism affect trust for different aid information reliability? 
 The simple answer is no. Level of anthropomorphism does not interact with 
information reliability for navigation decision aid tasks. The main results of Study 1 show 
that without including an image of a person, participants do not significantly alter trust in 
an automated anthropomorphized aid even when there is a 18% difference in aid 
reliability. The study did confirm that automation of medium and high reliability is 
beneficial to human performance when compared to using no automation aid. The 
conclusion is that high levels of information reliability in an automated system 
contributes to human overreliance. This is evidenced by the ability of participants to 
better identify false information in moderately reliable compared with exceedingly 
reliable automation environments. 
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How do humans behaviorally respond to visually anthropomorphized aids in a 
navigational context? 
 Key takeaways are that people tend to view non-anthropomorphic imagery 
differently than forms of anthropomorphic imagery, and that the high anthropomorphic 
cartoon condition may help to better calibrate human trust in a navigation-based 
automated decision aid. Null results across all levels of imagery used in Study 1 and 
Study 2 raise some questions regarding the similarities and differences between 
anthropomorphism and realism. Anthropomorphism as defined by the scale used in this 
study may not actually matter, or it may be dependent on how aid imagery is 
conceptualized and organized by the average person. When grouping the data by realism, 
we see higher objective trust in realistic imagery (cone and female reporter photo), and 
poor performance when given bad advice. While still not significant, results for both 
performance and objective trust showed more prominent trends than the results from 
Study 1 or Study 2 suggesting that realism may be a better framework by which to 
evaluate decision aid imagery.  
 
Future Research, Limitations, and Implications 
Further research is needed to explore the effects of iconic abstraction as a visual 
accompaniment to information decision aids. Results of the conducted research yielded 
interesting data trends but no conclusive evidence that level of anthropomorphism or 
bifurcated realism had a significant effect on system trust. In spite of repeated pilot image 
perception testing, visual image aspects may have been overlooked. All images portrayed 
Caucasian figures that were meant to be gender ambiguous or female. A known limitation 
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of these studies is with the inclusion of gender and ethnic specific images. Visual styling 
such as gender and ethnicity have been studied in non-navigational contexts and have 
shown that people tend to trust images with ethnic and gender traits similar to their own. 
Trait matching to each participant was not a feasible solution for this study given the 
limited development resources. Other perceived aspects like playfulness and expertise 
remain generally understudied in the realm of automated decision aids. Based on these 
results, perceived domain expertise of an image may hold more weight than the realistic 
nature of the image itself, even in low risk domains such as daily routing and navigation. 
Image realism and expertise may not be mutually exclusive, but understanding how each 
impacts trust could help to focus applied efforts beyond navigation in creating personas 
to engender appropriate trust in AI applications for other domains. 
 Another limitation of this body of work is the isolation of visual from auditory 
manifestations of anthropomorphism in navigation which is a voice dominant field. The 
tasks were all set prior to actual driving making visual information a safe and appropriate 
option, however perceived anthropomorphism and realism in automated voice is too 
important to ignore. To avoid a convoluted study design and to unpack the visual aspects 
of personifying navigation aid advice, all aspects of automated voice remained 
untouched. This however provides an opportunity for researchers to evaluate similar traits 
such as playfulness and expertise within the auditory expression of information decision 
aid advice. The way in which purely auditory information is conveyed to a driver is 
thought to affect both attention and trust. As the attentional demands of “drivers” change 
with more autonomous vehicles entering the market, it will be interesting to see how 
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navigation decisions are communicated and whether or not there will be a shift back to 
visual. 
The greatest benefit of this work lies in the abstraction of results into 
understanding how people are making decisions prior to the act of driving. This includes 
knowing what information is needed in order to be confident in a decision; how much 
stake is put in the advice provided by the decision aid; and ultimately what contributes to 
trusting the aid and compliance with the advice it offers. For example, communication 
and visual verification of the current traffic conditions, as expressed through the 
frequency of peeking behavior of the objective trust measure, is important to help the 
human understand and predict how the system is generating the advice. 
As tech companies are moving towards personal assistant models for the home 
and vehicle, the information presented in this paper can help researchers and companies 
to frame decision aid-type advice in a way that can achieve the greatest level of 
compliance without endangering the appropriateness of trust in the system. 
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